286 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
286 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Research Brief
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Working research brief for Strawberry's current approach and implementation direction.
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## Linked Documents
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- [PLAN.md](PLAN.md)
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- [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md)
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- [README.md](README.md)
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- [UX.md](UX.md)
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## Scope
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Strawberry's intended design combines:
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- Linux runtime telemetry
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- eBPF/libbpf-based process observation
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- YARA-based file or process-memory matching
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- graph or provenance-style relationship analysis
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- a local embedded store for indicators and relationships
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This is not a formal systematic literature review. It is a focused, implementation-oriented reading list assembled on **April 25, 2026** from paperbridge results to guide architecture and sequencing.
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The brief was refreshed on **April 26, 2026** to sharpen two now-immediate topics:
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- a real **correlation engine** for detections over Strawberry's stored process/file/indicator graph
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- a real **analyst UX**, likely a native process-centric desktop app rather than only a minimal local web trace viewer
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## Core Research Position
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The literature supports the overall direction:
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1. **Runtime process telemetry is a strong foundation**
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- eBPF-based observation is now a practical basis for low-overhead Linux runtime security systems.
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2. **Pure signatures are insufficient on their own**
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- YARA remains useful for triage and known-pattern matching, but stealthy or fileless behavior requires behavioral context.
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3. **Provenance and graph analysis materially improve detection**
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- Process/file/network relationships help surface multi-step attacks that point detectors miss.
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4. **Online graph systems must be concise and efficient**
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- The strongest practical systems prioritize compact graph construction, bounded search, and interpretable attack paths.
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5. **Provenance systems can be evaded**
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- Mimicry and behavior blending are real risks, so Strawberry should treat graph analysis as one layer, not a complete defense.
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6. **Operators need correlated findings, not raw graph exhaust**
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- The literature on threat hunting and SOC workflows repeatedly points toward aggregation, explanation, and human-usable pivots rather than standalone low-level events.
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## Implications for Strawberry
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### 1) eBPF telemetry should come before advanced graph analytics
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Without trustworthy runtime events, the graph layer is mostly hypothetical. The literature consistently assumes reliable event capture first, then higher-order reasoning.
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### 2) YARA should be integrated as an enrichment layer
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The best fit for Strawberry is:
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- use eBPF or process telemetry to decide **what to inspect**
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- use YARA to scan files or memory regions when warranted
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- store both the match and the surrounding execution context
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### 3) The embedded database should preserve relationships, not just hits
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A local store is most useful when it keeps:
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- indicators
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- process metadata
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- parent/child edges
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- file access or execution links
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- timestamps
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This makes later provenance or graph-style analysis possible even before advanced ML is added.
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### 4) The first milestone should be deterministic, local, and inspectable
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The literature shows the value of online systems, but Strawberry is earlier than that. The right near-term target is a small, verifiable local pipeline:
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1. capture a process event
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2. resolve an executable path
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3. hash and/or scan it
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4. persist the result and relationship edges
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5. query the stored trail back out
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### 5) The next major subsystem should be correlation
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Strawberry now has enough substrate to justify a correlation layer:
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- process execution events
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- process lineage edges
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- executable-image file nodes
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- YARA-backed indicator hits
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- timestamps and partial runtime context
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The next literature-aligned step is to convert these into **finding candidates** or **incident summaries** rather than leaving them as raw stored graph elements.
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### 6) The long-term operator surface should be process-centric
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The current local web GUI is good for evaluation, but the operator workflow implied by the literature is:
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- search for a process, executable, or indicator
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- pivot through lineage and related artifacts
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- inspect a concise correlated explanation
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- expand into supporting evidence only when needed
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That argues for a richer analyst surface. A native Qt app is a reasonable fit if Strawberry stays local-first and desktop-oriented.
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## Literature by Theme
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### A. Provenance / graph-based detection
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#### GID: Graph-based Intrusion Detection on Massive Process Traces for Enterprise Security Systems
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- Boxiang Dong et al., 2016
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- Link: https://huggingface.co/papers/1608.02639
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- Why it matters:
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- Strong evidence that graph representations of heterogeneous process traces improve detection over single-event views.
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- Relevant to Strawberry's process + relationship model.
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#### You Are What You Do: Hunting Stealthy Malware via Data Provenance Analysis
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- Qi Wang et al., 2020
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24167
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- Why it matters:
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- Strong theoretical and practical support for provenance-centric malware hunting.
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- Reinforces that behavior chains can expose stealthy attacks even when obvious payload artifacts are absent.
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#### Unicorn: Runtime Provenance-Based Detector for Advanced Persistent Threats
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- Xueyuan Han et al., 2020
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24046
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- Why it matters:
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- Demonstrates that long-lived, low-and-slow attacks can be modeled from runtime provenance.
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- Relevant to Strawberry's interest in persistent local graph storage.
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#### NODLINK: An Online System for Fine-Grained APT Attack Detection and Investigation
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- Shaofei Li et al., 2024
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2024.23204
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- Why it matters:
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- Highlights the importance of concise, interpretable online provenance graphs.
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- Useful design pressure against building an overgrown, low-signal graph store.
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#### POIROT: Aligning Attack Behavior with Kernel Audit Records for Cyber Threat Hunting
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- Sadegh M. Milajerdi et al., 2019
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- Link: https://huggingface.co/papers/1910.00056
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- Why it matters:
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- Shows how graph matching over kernel-audit-derived provenance can support threat hunting.
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- Suggests a future direction for query-driven hunt workflows in Strawberry.
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#### Sometimes, You Aren't What You Do: Mimicry Attacks against Provenance Graph Host Intrusion Detection Systems
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- Akul Goyal et al., 2023
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2023.24207
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- Why it matters:
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- Important cautionary paper.
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- Strawberry should assume provenance graphs are valuable but attackable; YARA, hashing, and policy signals should remain complementary layers.
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### B. YARA and rule-based enrichment
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#### Scanning memory with Yara
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- Michael Cohen, 2017
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2017.02.005
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- Why it matters:
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- Directly relevant to Strawberry's proposed process-memory scanning path.
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- Supports treating YARA as more than just a file scanner.
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#### APIARY: An API-based automatic rule generator for YARA to enhance malware detection
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- Antonio Coscia et al., 2025
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104397
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- Why it matters:
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- Not required for v1, but useful for future rule-authoring workflows.
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- Suggests Strawberry could later support generated or curated rule pipelines instead of only hand-maintained rules.
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### C. eBPF and Linux runtime security
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#### bpfbox
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- William Findlay, Anil Somayaji, David Barrera, 2020
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3411495.3421358
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- Why it matters:
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- Demonstrates practical eBPF-based confinement and security instrumentation on Linux.
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- Useful proof that eBPF can anchor security controls, not just passive observation.
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#### Comparative Analysis of eBPF-Based Runtime Security Monitoring Tools in Monitoring and Threat Detection on Kubernetes
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- Aldien Asy Syairozi and Arizal, 2025
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5220/0014272700004928
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- Why it matters:
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- Practical comparative context for modern eBPF-based security tooling.
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- Even though Kubernetes is not Strawberry's immediate scope, the operational tradeoffs are relevant.
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#### DySec: A Machine Learning-based Dynamic Analysis for Detecting Malicious Packages in PyPI Ecosystem
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- Sk Tanzir Mehedi et al., 2025
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- Link: https://huggingface.co/papers/2503.00324
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- Why it matters:
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- Shows eBPF telemetry being used in a practical detection pipeline for malicious install-time behavior.
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- Useful evidence for a staged Strawberry pipeline: observe first, enrich second, classify or score later.
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### D. Correlation, threat hunting, and analyst workflow
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#### Real-time Analytics for APT Detection and Threat Hunting Using Cyber-threat Intelligence and Provenance Graphs
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- V.N. Venkatakrishnan, 2025
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3716815.3729016
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- Why it matters:
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- Direct support for a **correlation engine** that combines provenance structure with higher-level threat knowledge.
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- Reinforces that Strawberry's graph should feed hunt and triage workflows, not merely archive events.
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#### LogKernel: A Threat Hunting Approach Based on Behaviour Provenance Graph and Graph Kernel Clustering
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- Jiawei Li et al., 2022
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- Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.08820
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- Why it matters:
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- Supports the idea that suspicious behavior should be identified over **subgraphs or paths**, not isolated events.
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- Useful pressure toward compact scoring over bounded behavior windows.
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#### threaTrace: Detecting and Tracing Host-based Threats in Node Level Through Provenance Graph Learning
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- Su Wang et al., 2021
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- Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.04333
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- Why it matters:
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- Suggests Strawberry should preserve enough per-entity context to support future node-level scoring.
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- Also supports a process-centric analyst UX where an operator starts from one suspicious entity and expands outward.
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#### TDLens: Toward an empirical evaluation of provenance graph-based approach to cyber threat detection
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- Rui Mei et al., 2022
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.23919/jcc.2022.00.028
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- Why it matters:
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- Useful reminder to validate whether the graph layer actually improves detection quality instead of assuming it does.
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- Good evidence for benchmarking a future Strawberry correlation engine against simpler baselines.
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#### Security Operations Center: A Systematic Study and Open Challenges
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- Manfred Vielberth et al., 2020
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- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3045514
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- Why it matters:
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- Reinforces that analyst workflow, process, and explanation matter as much as raw technical detection.
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- Supports building Strawberry around concise pivots, triage views, and explainable outputs.
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#### An Interview Study on Third-Party Cyber Threat Hunting Processes in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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- William P. Maxam and James C. Davis, 2024
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- Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12252
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- Why it matters:
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- Indicates that threat hunting workflows are still variable and tool support remains a practical pain point.
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- Supports building Strawberry's next UX around fast search, pivoting, and repeatable analyst workflows.
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#### Enhancing Cyber Threat Hunting — A Visual Approach with the Forensic Visualization Toolkit
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- Jihane Najar et al., 2025
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- Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.09185
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- Why it matters:
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- More tentative and newer than the other references, but directionally useful for UI thinking.
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- Supports graph-aware visual exploration once Strawberry's underlying search and correlation model is stable.
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## Research-Grounded Design Guidance
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Based on the papers above, Strawberry should prefer:
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- **event capture before advanced scoring**
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- **local persistence before distributed orchestration**
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- **graph context plus signatures**, not either one alone
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- **compact, queryable provenance trails** over vague “graph database” ambitions
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- **layered detection**, because provenance-only systems can be evaded
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- **correlated findings over raw hits**, because operators need explanation and prioritization
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- **process-first investigation UX**, because that is the most defensible current pivot in Strawberry's data model
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## Open Questions
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1. Should Strawberry target:
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- a lightweight host detector, or
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- a threat-hunting substrate with replayable provenance?
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2. Is the immediate “make” goal:
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- GNU Make wrapper support, or
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- Make.com automation/integration?
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3. How much provenance is enough for v1?
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- process spawn edges only
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- process + file edges
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- process + file + network edges
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4. Should the first correlation engine be:
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- simple rule/heuristic based
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- subgraph/pattern based
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- anomaly scored over bounded provenance windows
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5. Should the first serious analyst UI remain web-local, or move to a native Qt desktop shell?
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6. When should Strawberry add thread-level pivots?
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- only after true thread/TID telemetry exists
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- or via a process-first UI with deferred thread support
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## Recommended v1 Research Interpretation
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The best literature-aligned v1 is:
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- Linux-only
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- eBPF-backed process execution telemetry
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- YARA-backed file and optionally process-memory scanning
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- local embedded persistence
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- process lineage and file relationship edges
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- simple rule- or heuristic-driven **correlation and triage**
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- a process-centric operator UX, with thread-level pivots deferred until the telemetry model actually supports them
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That scope is ambitious enough to be meaningful and small enough to make real.
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