strawberry/API_CONTRACT.md
trvon caf52de559
Add a macOS CI job and document the port
The macos job (macos-15, Homebrew deps, Qt app skipped) builds and
runs meson test. It only runs on GitHub: Forgejo also reads
.github/workflows and has no macOS runner.

README: macOS build, the Linux to macOS backend map, ES requirements
and installed files. API_CONTRACT: macOS socket path and peer
credentials, the endpoint_security and libproc backend values, and
the macOS status fields. DEVELOPER: platform map and the GitHub +
Forgejo remotes. AGENTS: current state of the port, including that
the ES backends have not run live yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 20:53:27 -06:00

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Strawberry Interface Contract

Strawberry exposes two local interfaces. Neither opens a network port. The desktop app, the CLI and the MCP server (strawberry-mcp, for agents) are all clients of these two.

  1. Control socket: a Unix socket served by the root daemon, for live status, operator actions (reload, rescan, rule updates), policy changes, and response actions (containment, quarantine, memory scan, suspend/kill).
  2. Evidence: the embedded database, read read-only by clients (Database::open_read_only()), and the CLI --json views over it.

Access control

What Path (systemd install) Owner / mode Who can use it
Control socket /run/strawberry/control.sock (macOS /var/run/strawberry/control.sock) root:strawberry 0660 (dir 0750) uid 0, the daemon's own uid, members of strawberry
Evidence DB /var/lib/strawberry/database.db root:strawberry 0640 (dir 0750) members of strawberry (read-only)
Rules /etc/strawberry/rules/ root 0700 root only

The daemon re-checks peer credentials (SO_PEERCRED; macOS LOCAL_PEERCRED + LOCAL_PEERPID) on every connection, independent of the file mode. Configure the socket with control_socket_path (empty disables it) and control_group in strawberry.conf.

Control socket protocol

  • One request per connection.
  • Request: a single verb terminated by \n, at most 64 bytes. Plain verbs take no arguments; payload verbs take exactly one JSON line (see below); scan-fd takes one passed file descriptor. Anything else (extra words, different case, unknown verbs) is rejected without running anything.
  • The read timeout is 2 s. A request with no newline is rejected.
  • Reply: one JSON line, then the daemon closes the connection.
{"ok":true,"verb":"<verb>","data":<object>}
{"ok":false,"error":"<message>"}

Errors include permission denied, unknown command, request too long, request timed out, empty request and rescan rate limited; retry in Ns.

status

{
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "pid": 1234,
  "now_ns": 1792887028777076502,
  "started_at_ns": 1792887022744355381,
  "running": true,
  "config_path": "/etc/strawberry/strawberry.conf",
  "db_path": "/var/lib/strawberry/database.db",
  "monitor": {
    "enabled": true,
    "backend": "bpf",
    "execveat": true,
    "fork_tracepoint": false,
    "events": 72,
    "events_dropped": 0,
    "queue_depth": 0
  },
  "rules": {
    "path": "/etc/strawberry/rules",
    "required": true,
    "loaded": true,
    "files": 2,
    "count": 5142,
    "generation": 2,
    "loaded_at_ns": 1792887025771774835,
    "last_error": ""
  },
  "pipeline": {
    "events": 72,
    "scanned": 44,
    "cache_hits": 28,
    "detections": 1,
    "images_unavailable": 0,
    "images_too_large": 0,
    "suppressed": 1,
    "scan_errors": 0,
    "persist_failures": 0,
    "last_detection_ns": 1792887024282406813
  },
  "feeds": {
    "dir": "/var/lib/strawberry/feeds",
    "configured": [{"id": "yara-forge-core", "enabled": true}],
    "state": {"feeds": [{"id": "yara-forge-core", "ok": true, "version": "20261018", "rules": 5137, "error": ""}]},
    "allowlist_entries": 1,
    "policy_error": ""
  },
  "prevention": {
    "mode": "audit", "min_severity": "critical", "active": true, "error": "",
    "marked_filesystems": 4, "checked": 812, "cache_hits": 790, "blocked": 0,
    "would_block": 0, "timeouts": 0, "unscanned": 1
  },
  "behavior": {
    "network_tracepoints": true, "file_watch": true, "file_watch_locations": 15, "file_watch_error": "",
    "connects": 1204, "file_writes": 37, "detections": 0, "ioc_networks": 1688
  },
  "opensnitch": {
    "integration": true, "installed": true, "checksums_enabled": true,
    "rules_dir": "/etc/opensnitchd/rules", "containments": 0,
    "blocklists": {"entries": {"domains": 124712, "ips": 1, "nets": 1687}, "error": "",
                   "rules": ["strawberry-ioc-domains", "strawberry-ioc-ips", "strawberry-ioc-nets"]}
  }
}
  • All *_ns values are wall-clock nanoseconds since the Unix epoch.
  • monitor.backend is bpf, procfs, endpoint_security, libproc or none. procfs (Linux) and libproc (macOS) are polling fallbacks: eBPF or Endpoint Security was unavailable, and short-lived processes can be missed.
  • macOS: behavior.network_tracepoints is always false (Endpoint Security has no connect event); prevention.error and behavior.file_watch_error name the missing ES requirement (root, entitlement, Full Disk Access).
  • rules.generation increments on every successful load.
  • rules.last_error is set when the most recent reload failed. The previous rules stay active.
  • pipeline.images_unavailable counts executions whose image was gone or replaced before it could be read.
  • prevention.active is false (with error) when fanotify permission events are unavailable, for example without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. timeouts counts executions allowed because no verdict arrived in time.
  • resources (resource governor): profile, level (normal / warning / critical / emergency), host_busy, host_severe, own_cpu_pct (of cpu_capacity CPUs), rss_mb / memory_budget_mb, host (PSI or loadavg, mem_available_mb), cgroup limits, deferring (work classes waiting) and longest_deferral_s, per-class work counters, guard_degraded, read_paced_ms, inventory_pending, memory_scans_skipped, large_scans_pending / large_scan_coalesced (uncached images over 8 MiB are scanned off the live path, once per image), worker_errors (events whose handling threw; skipped), thread_errors (threads stopped by an exception), swallowed_exceptions (exceptions recorded where nothing more could be done, e.g. in destructors or C callbacks; each is logged with file:line), effective limits.
  • timings: per step {count, mean/p50/p95/p99/max_ms} for exec_decision, exec_assess, queue_wait, image_scan, yara_scan, db_commit, correlation, rule_compile, memory_scan; image_size in MiB; bytes_read, yara_timeouts, memory_queue_depth. Percentiles are log2 bucket upper bounds (within 2×).
  • behavior.network_tracepoints reports the connect/ptrace/module tracepoints. file_watch reports the fanotify persistence/drop watcher, which needs file-handle support, so it doesn't work on overlayfs.

reload-rules

{"reloaded": true, "error": ""}

Recompiles every .yar/.yara file under rules.path. On failure, reloaded is false, error holds the first compiler message, and the previous rule set keeps running.

rescan

{"queued": true}

Asks the monitor to re-emit every running process. The rescan runs on the monitor thread, so this returns immediately. It is rate-limited to once per 30 s. A process image already scanned under the current rules generation is not recorded twice, so rescan after reload-rules to apply new rules to running processes.

scan-fd

The client opens a file with its own permissions and sends the verb line plus exactly one open descriptor in the same sendmsg (SCM_RIGHTS). The daemon never receives or resolves a path, so it can't be used to read files the caller couldn't open.

{
  "scanned": true,
  "error": "",
  "size": 47445,
  "sha256": "<hex>",
  "matches": [
    {"rule": "Strawberry_Test_Marker", "severity": "low", "namespace": "default", "tags": [], "meta": "description=...; severity=low"}
  ]
}
  • Regular files only, at most scan_max_bytes (default 64 MiB).
  • The file is read into a private buffer before scanning. The hash and scan see the same bytes, and a caller truncating the file can't fault the daemon.
  • Rate-limited to 300 scans/min. Results are not stored as evidence. Each scan is logged with the caller's uid/pid.
  • scan-fd without a descriptor, with more than one, or a descriptor attached to any other verb is rejected. Every received descriptor is closed.

policy

Read-only. Returns the operator policy and the updater's per-feed state:

{
  "policy": {
    "path": "/var/lib/strawberry/policy.json",
    "feeds": [{"id": "yara-forge-core", "name": "YARA Forge core", "type": "github-release",
               "repo": "YARAHQ/yara-forge", "asset": "yara-forge-rules-core.zip", "enabled": true,
               "added_by": 0, "added_at": 0}],
    "allowlist": [{"id": "allow-a964413a", "kind": "sha256", "value": "<hex>", "rule": "",
                   "note": "socat is a legit admin tool", "added_by": 1000, "added_at": 1792895972627876720}],
    "history": [{"at": 1792895972627876720, "uid": 1000, "action": "allowlist-add", "summary": "sha256 <hex>"}]
  },
  "feed_state": {"updated_at": 0, "feeds": [{"id": "yara-forge-core", "ok": true, "version": "20261018",
                 "sha256": "<hex>", "rule_files": 1, "rules": 5137, "checked_at": 0, "updated_at": 0, "error": ""}]},
  "feeds_dir": "/var/lib/strawberry/feeds",
  "policy_error": ""
}

Payload verbs: allowlist-add, allowlist-remove, feed-add, feed-remove, feed-set-enabled

Format. The verb line is followed by exactly one JSON line of at most 8 KiB. Anything else is rejected:

  • a missing payload line
  • extra lines
  • a payload attached to any other verb

Validation is strict, and unknown fields are rejected:

Verb Payload
allowlist-add {"kind":"sha256","value":"<64 hex>","rule"?,"note"?}, {"kind":"path","value":"/abs/path or /dir/","rule"?,"note"?}, {"kind":"rule","value":"RuleName","note"?}
allowlist-remove {"id":"allow-…"}
feed-add {"id":"[a-z0-9-]{1,32}","name"?,"kind"?,"type":"github-release","repo":"owner/name","asset":"file.zip","enabled"?} or {"id":…,"kind"?,"type":"url","url":"https://…" | "urls":[1–10 URLs],"sha256"?,"auth_header_file"?}. kind is yara (default), hashes, domains, ips or nets; sha256 only with a single URL; auth_header_file is an absolute path to a root-only file holding one Header: value line, read by the updater
feed-remove {"id":"…"}
feed-set-enabled {"id":"…","enabled":true}

Limits:

  • 1000 allowlist entries, 20 feeds
  • paths must be absolute and normalized
  • URLs must be https://
  • rule names match [A-Za-z0-9_]{1,128}
  • 30 changes per minute

Behavior.

  • Every change is persisted atomically, recorded in history with the caller's uid, and logged.
  • Feed changes reload the rules immediately. Adding or enabling a feed also requests an update.
  • Paths and URLs in the policy are stored strings: the root daemon never opens them. URLs are fetched only by the sandboxed updater.

Matching (process detections):

  • sha256 suppresses every rule on that exact binary, optionally limited to one rule.
  • path matches the resolved executable path exactly, or by prefix when it ends in /, optionally limited to one rule.
  • rule suppresses that rule everywhere.
  • Suppressed detections are counted in pipeline.suppressed and are not stored.
  • On-demand scan-fd matches report allowlisted_by instead of being hidden.

Protection and response verbs

Same payload format and the same 30-changes-per-minute limit. They take hashes or ids, never paths: paths always come from Strawberry's own stored evidence, so the root daemon cannot be pointed at an arbitrary file. None of them are exposed through MCP.

Verb Payload Effect
protection-set any of {"contain_auto":bool,"contain_min_severity":"low…critical","prevention_mode":"off"|"audit"|"enforce","prevention_min_severity":"low…critical"} Saves protection settings and applies them live. Defaults: auto-contain on at high, prevention audit at critical.
contain-add {"sha256":"<64 hex>"} Writes an OpenSnitch deny rule for a binary seen in stored evidence. Reply: {"containment":{"id","rule","hash_pinned","path","new"}}.
contain-remove {"id":"contain-…"} Removes the rule (undo).
quarantine {"sha256":"<64 hex>"} Blocks every execution of that exact binary in every prevention mode (the exec guard runs hash-only when prevention is off) and contains its network. The file is not moved. Reply: {"quarantined","path","execution_blocked","network_contained","network_error","note"}.
quarantine-remove {"sha256":"<64 hex>"} Releases the quarantine and its containment.
scan-memory {"node_id":"process_<pid>_<boot>_<start>"} Queues a YARA scan of the live process's memory (yr_rules_scan_proc, 30 s timeout). Matches are stored as source=memory indicators and become findings. Reply: {"queued":true,"pid","path"}.
process-suspend / process-resume / process-kill {"node_id":"process_<pid>_<boot>_<start>"} SIGSTOP / SIGCONT / SIGKILL. Reply: {"done","pid","path"}.

Process safety. Process verbs accept only the stable node id. The legacy process_<pid> form is refused. The daemon resolves the pid from /proc, and the boot id plus start time must match, so a reused PID can never be hit. process-* verbs refuse:

  • pid 1 and the daemon itself
  • core session and system processes: systemd and its daemons, dbus, opensnitchd, the display server and compositor, display managers, sshd, polkitd, NetworkManager, PipeWire, Strawberry itself

Every action is recorded in policy history with the caller's uid.

Automatic actions (all recorded in history and shown in the app's Response tab):

  • Containment. A stored detection at or above contain_min_severity (not allowlisted, not in /usr, /bin, /sbin, /lib*, /boot or /etc) gets an OpenSnitch deny rule. It is pinned to the binary's MD5 when OpenSnitch has EnableChecksums, otherwise path-only.
  • Exec prevention (fanotify FAN_OPEN_EXEC_PERM, needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN):
    • audit records "would have been blocked".
    • enforce denies with EPERM on an IOC hash match or a YARA match at or above prevention_min_severity.
    • System locations are never denied (alert only), allowlisted binaries are never denied, and quarantined binaries are always denied.
    • An unanswered event is allowed after prevention_timeout_ms (default 1000), and so are files larger than process_scan_max_bytes.
  • Memory scans run automatically for memfd executions, deleted non-system executables and ptrace targets (bounded queue, one at a time, each process scanned once).

update-rules

{"requested": true}

Touches <feeds_dir>/update-requested. The strawberry-update.path unit then starts the updater. Rate-limited to once per 5 minutes.

Audit

Every request except status is logged as [ControlServer] uid=<uid> pid=<pid> verb=<verb> result=ok|error. Denied peers are logged too.

CLI equivalents

strawberry --status [--json] [config_path]
strawberry --reload-rules [config_path]
strawberry --rescan [config_path]
strawberry --scan-file <path> [config_path]   # opened as you, sent via scan-fd
strawberry --policy [config_path]
strawberry --policy-set <verb> '<json>' [config_path]   # any payload verb, e.g. quarantine '{"sha256":"…"}'
strawberry --opensnitch-enable-checksums                 # root: set Rules.EnableChecksums in OpenSnitch (keeps a .bak)
strawberry --request-rule-update [config_path]

Local, no socket:

strawberry --update-rules [config_path]   # run the updater (what strawberry-update.service does)
strawberry --check-rules [config_path]    # compile local + installed feed rules, print the count

Rule feeds and the updater

strawberry-update.service runs strawberry --update-rules:

  • daily, via strawberry-update.timer
  • on request, via strawberry-update.path

It runs sandboxed: no capabilities, writes only /var/lib/strawberry/feeds, network limited to IPv4/IPv6/Unix. For each enabled feed it:

  1. Resolves the release. github-release uses GET /repos/<repo>/releases/latest and requires the asset's published sha256: digest. url uses the optional pinned sha256.
  2. Skips the feed if the version and digest are unchanged.
  3. Downloads over HTTPS only (TLS verified, ≤ 64 MiB, ≤ 3 redirects) and verifies the digest.
  4. Extracts only regular *.yar/*.yara entries, flattened to sanitized basenames. Symlinks, devices and traversal are dropped; ≤ 256 MiB extracted.
  5. Compiles the staged rules together with the local rules and the other feeds. On failure the previous version stays active.
  6. Installs feeds/<id>/<version>/ and atomically switches feeds/<id>/current, keeping one previous version.
  7. Writes feeds/state.json, then sends reload-rules.

The daemon loads yara_rules_path (default namespace) plus every enabled feeds/<id>/current in namespace <id>. GitHub's anonymous API limit is 60 requests/hour per IP. On a 403/429 rate limit the updater keeps the current rules and retries; github_token_file raises the limit.

Each prints the reply line. Exit codes:

  • 0: ok:true
  • 1: ok:false
  • 2: could not reach the daemon

Threat-intel list feeds

List feeds (kind hashes, domains, ips, nets) use the same pipeline, with these differences:

  • They download one or more URLs.
  • Lines are parsed after stripping #/; comments and hosts-file prefixes. Each entry is validated (64-hex SHA-256, domain syntax, inet_pton, CIDR no broader than /8 for IPv4 or /16 for IPv6, checked again when loaded), deduped and capped (5M hashes, 2M domains, 1M IPs/nets).
  • A normalized list.txt is installed under the same current switch.
  • Shrink guard: a new list under 10% of the previous size is rejected as truncated, and the old one stays.

Default feeds, seeded once (a default you remove stays removed):

id kind Source
yara-forge-core yara YARAHQ/yara-forge core release
malware-hashes hashes romainmarcoux/malicious-hash full-hash-sha256-aa.txt
cert-pl-domains domains CERT Polska hole.cert.pl/domains/v2/domains.txt
spamhaus-drop nets Spamhaus DROP
feodo-c2 ips abuse.ch Feodo Tracker recommended C2 IPs

Hash feeds become the IOC_KnownMalwareHash detection (critical, source=ioc). IP and net feeds drive the IOC_Connection behavior rule. Domain, IP and net feeds are also exported to OpenSnitch.

YARA severity comes from meta.severity, else meta.score (≥ 90 critical, ≥ 70 high, ≥ 40 medium, else low).

OpenSnitch files

When opensnitch_integration=true and opensnitch_rules_dir (default /etc/opensnitchd/rules) exists, the daemon writes only strawberry-*.json files there (mode 0600, written atomically). OpenSnitch reloads them on change.

File Rule
strawberry-ioc-domains.json, -ips.json, -nets.json deny, precedence, operator lists.domains / lists.ips / lists.nets over <state_dir>/opensnitch/lists/<kind>/strawberry.txt (domains as 0.0.0.0 host)
strawberry-contain-<sha256[0:12]>.json deny, precedence, process.path and (with checksums) process.hash.md5

List rules are refreshed after each feed update and removed when no list feed is enabled.

Evidence (read-only)

strawberry --list-findings --json [config_path]
strawberry --show-finding <finding_id> --json [config_path]
strawberry --search-process <query> --json [config_path]
strawberry --trace-process <pid> [--trace-depth n] [config_path]
strawberry --trace-node <node_id> [--trace-depth n] [config_path]

These open the database read-only and never write back, so they are safe to run while the daemon is active.

GraphNode

{
  "id": "process_654_a902af2e_9798407",
  "type": "process",
  "properties": {
    "pid": "654",
    "path": "/tmp/payload",
    "hash": "<sha256>",
    "cmdline": "payload --flag",
    "parent_pid": "1",
    "parent_node_id": "process_1_a902af2e_12",
    "start_time_ticks": "9798407",
    "boot_id": "<hex>",
    "exe_deleted": "true",
    "exe_memfd": "true",
    "event_timestamp_ns": "1792887024282406813"
  }
}

Node types:

  • process
  • file (file_<sha256>)
  • indicator

Process IDs have the form process_<pid>_<boot8>_<start_ticks>, so a reused PID does not merge different processes. Older evidence and synthetic data may still use process_<pid>. Properties are string→string and may be absent.

Finding

{
  "id": "finding_process_yara_...",
  "title": "YARA match on executed process image",
  "severity": "high",
  "score": 85,
  "summary": "Process 429675 executed /memfd:payload ... matched 2 indicators (MemfdExecution, Strawberry_Test_Marker).",
  "first_seen": 1792887024282406813,
  "last_seen": 1792887024282406813,
  "related_node_ids": ["process_429675_a902af2e_9798410", "file_<sha256>", "indicator_process-hit:..."],
  "related_indicator_ids": ["process-hit:..."],
  "metadata": {
    "engine": "strawberry-rule-correlation-v1",
    "rule": "process_executable_yara_match",
    "process_node_id": "process_429675_a902af2e_9798410"
  }
}
  • Correlation rules:
    • process_executable_yara_match
    • lineage_multiple_yara_matches
    • same_hash_multiple_process_matches
    • same_yara_rule_multiple_processes
  • Heuristic-only process findings are titled "Suspicious executed process image". They come from indicators with source=heuristic:
    • MemfdExecution (high)
    • DeletedExecutable (low)

ProcessSearchResult

{
  "process": { "id": "process_654_...", "type": "process", "properties": {} },
  "matched_fields": ["pid", "finding"],
  "first_seen": 123456780,
  "last_seen": 123456789,
  "parent_process": null,
  "child_processes": [],
  "related_nodes": [],
  "findings": []
}

MCP server (strawberry-mcp)

MCP over stdio (newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0). Supported protocol versions: 2025-11-25, 2025-06-18, 2025-03-26, 2024-11-05. stdout carries protocol messages only; logs go to stderr.

claude mcp add strawberry -- strawberry-mcp               # full
claude mcp add strawberry -- strawberry-mcp --read-only   # queries only

Flags:

  • --config (where to read control_socket_path; default /etc/strawberry/strawberry.conf)
  • --socket
  • --db (default: the path the daemon reports)
  • --read-only
Tool Arguments Read-only mode
strawberry_status — yes
strawberry_list_findings min_severity (low/medium/high/critical), since_ns, limit 1–200 (50) yes
strawberry_get_finding id yes
strawberry_search_processes query, limit 1–50 (20) yes
strawberry_get_process node_id, trace_depth 0–4 (2) yes
strawberry_get_policy — (feeds, allowlist, update state; agents cannot change policy) yes
strawberry_scan_paths paths (1–20 absolute), recursive (false), max_files 1–2000 (200) hidden
strawberry_reload_rules — hidden
strawberry_rescan — hidden

Results. Each result carries a one-line text summary, the JSON as text, and the same JSON in structuredContent. Finding and node objects use the same shapes as the CLI --json output; a test checks they match.

Errors.

  • Schema violations and unknown tools: JSON-RPC -32602.
  • Execution failures (daemon down, missing finding, evidence unreadable): a result with isError: true.

strawberry_scan_paths opens files with O_NOFOLLOW as the calling user.

  • It doesn't follow symlinks or descend into /proc, /sys or /dev.
  • It reports unreadable files without contacting the daemon.
  • It returns only matching files, errors and skipped entries, plus counts.

Untrusted data. Paths, command lines and rule metadata originate on the monitored host and may be attacker-written. The server's instructions tell agents to treat them as data. String fields are capped at 4 KiB, and invalid UTF-8 is replaced.