Some checks failed
Build and Test / build (debug, clang) (push) Has been cancelled
Build and Test / build (debug, gcc) (push) Has been cancelled
Build and Test / build (release, clang) (push) Has been cancelled
Build and Test / build (release, gcc) (push) Has been cancelled
Build and Test / macos (push) Has been cancelled
Build and Test / docker (push) Has been cancelled
Second half of the sandbox-safe tracker transport. A small relay in the host network namespace bridges OpenSnitch to the sandboxed daemon, so the daemon keeps PrivateNetwork=true + RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX and never sees argv/env. - `strawberry opensnitch relay` (new CLI verb, Map::flag -> --opensnitch-relay): binds the OpenSnitch loopback port via the existing OpenSnitchEventListener (root-peer check, argv/env dropped at parse), and forwards each redacted tuple (encode_connection) to the daemon's AF_UNIX ingest socket, reconnecting on failure. Foreground loop until SIGTERM/SIGINT; drops (not blocks) when the socket is down. Linux-only. The listener callback runs on one thread, so the sink needs no lock. - scripts/strawberry-trackerd.service: runs the relay in the host namespace with only CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, no PrivateNetwork, and /proc/net kept readable for the peer check (no ProcSubset=pid); otherwise the same tight sandbox as strawberry-update.service. install.sh installs+manifests+starts it when OpenSnitch is present and privacy_trackers is not false. - docs/tracker-attribution.md: replace the "known limitation" with the relay architecture (rejected alternatives noted). API_CONTRACT: privacy.listener now describes the ingest socket + relay; also documents feed-add max_severity (B1). Suite 51/51; clang static analyzer and clang-tidy clean on main.cpp and cli_commands.cpp. Full relay->OpenSnitch end-to-end needs host validation (sudo + a real OpenSnitch); the socket path is covered by E9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
52 lines
1.7 KiB
Desktop File
52 lines
1.7 KiB
Desktop File
[Unit]
|
|
Description=Strawberry tracker-attribution relay (OpenSnitch events -> daemon)
|
|
Documentation=https://github.com/trvon/strawberry
|
|
# Runs in the host network namespace so it can receive OpenSnitch's loopback
|
|
# connection events; forwards redacted tuples to the sandboxed daemon over its
|
|
# AF_UNIX ingest socket (docs/tracker-attribution.md). Advisory only.
|
|
After=strawberry.service opensnitchd.service
|
|
Wants=opensnitchd.service
|
|
|
|
[Service]
|
|
Type=simple
|
|
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/strawberry opensnitch relay --config /etc/strawberry/strawberry.conf
|
|
Restart=on-failure
|
|
RestartSec=10
|
|
|
|
# Minimal privilege: it only needs to bind the loopback OpenSnitch port (<1024),
|
|
# read /proc/net/tcp to confirm the peer is root, and connect the daemon's
|
|
# AF_UNIX ingest socket. It parses untrusted event bytes and drops argv/env
|
|
# before forwarding, so it keeps no capabilities beyond CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE.
|
|
User=root
|
|
Group=strawberry
|
|
UMask=0077
|
|
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
|
|
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
|
|
NoNewPrivileges=true
|
|
ProtectSystem=strict
|
|
ProtectHome=true
|
|
PrivateTmp=true
|
|
PrivateDevices=true
|
|
# NOT PrivateNetwork: the relay must share the host namespace with OpenSnitch.
|
|
ProtectKernelTunables=true
|
|
ProtectKernelModules=true
|
|
ProtectKernelLogs=true
|
|
ProtectControlGroups=true
|
|
ProtectClock=true
|
|
ProtectHostname=true
|
|
# ProtectProc=invisible is fine, but do NOT set ProcSubset=pid: the peer check
|
|
# reads /proc/net/tcp.
|
|
ProtectProc=invisible
|
|
RestrictNamespaces=true
|
|
RestrictRealtime=true
|
|
RestrictSUIDSGID=true
|
|
LockPersonality=true
|
|
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
|
|
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET
|
|
SystemCallArchitectures=native
|
|
SystemCallFilter=@system-service
|
|
SystemCallFilter=~@privileged @resources
|
|
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
|
|
|
|
[Install]
|
|
WantedBy=multi-user.target
|