# Tracker attribution (privacy, advisory only) Which programs on this machine talk to advertising and tracking networks, not only the browser. Built with the measurement rules of the CarolinaCon 2026 talk "How Ad Networks Map You" (`~/Documents/work/conference`, bridgescope): a contacted domain on a list is a *candidate*, not proof of tracking, and every observation is labelled with how strong it is. ## Rules - **Never blocks, never a finding.** Tracker contacts are not threats. They are never written to OpenSnitch or Little Snitch rules, never trigger containment, never raise a finding or an exec-guard decision. A source invariant (R11) keeps tracker code out of the response paths. - **Lists are labels, not ground truth.** Strength is `circumstantial`: a program reached a domain that a public list files under advertising or tracking. - **Redaction by construction.** OpenSnitch's event stream carries command lines and process environments (which can hold secrets). Strawberry reads the program path, pid and destination host in memory and keeps only the program, the matched list domain, the list, the port and the time. Arguments and environment are never stored or logged. - **On when OpenSnitch is there, easy to turn off.** The installer adds OpenSnitch's event logger when OpenSnitch is installed (maintainer decision, 2026-10-28), and EasyPrivacy is a default feed. `privacy_trackers=false` in strawberry.conf turns it off (the installer then leaves OpenSnitch alone). Contacts are visible to members of the `strawberry` group, like findings; the telemetry records are root-only. ## Pieces 1. **Feed kind `trackers`.** Hosts files, plain domain lists, and adblock whole-domain rules (`||host^`, optionally `$third-party`); rules with other options, paths or exceptions are skipped. Matching is by domain suffix (`a.b.tracker.example` matches `tracker.example`). Default list: EasyPrivacy by the EasyList authors (GPL-3.0+ or CC-BY-SA-3.0; downloaded at run time, attribution kept). Not a default: Disconnect's lists (CC-BY-NC-SA, non-commercial). 2. **OpenSnitch events via a host-namespace relay.** OpenSnitch (>= 1.6) streams connection events as JSON over TCP to a configured `remote` logger; it cannot send to a Unix socket or leave fields out, and each event carries the process's argv and environment. The daemon runs sandboxed (`PrivateNetwork=true` + `RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX`), so it can neither bind a loopback TCP port nor reach OpenSnitch's namespace. A small relay bridges the two without weakening the daemon: - **`strawberry opensnitch relay`** (unit `strawberry-trackerd.service`) runs in the host network namespace with only `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`. It binds the loopback port below 1024 (so no other user can take the stream and its environments), accepts a connection only from a root-owned socket (peer looked up in `/proc/net/tcp`), parses the event keeping only program, uid, destination host/ip/port, protocol and action, and **drops argv and environment before anything leaves the relay**. It bounds clients (4), object size (256 KiB) and buffered bytes (1 MiB). - It forwards each redacted tuple to the **daemon's AF_UNIX ingest socket** (`opensnitch_ingest_socket`, default `/run/strawberry/trackers.sock`), which the daemon *can* open under its sandbox. The daemon accepts only a root peer (`SO_PEERCRED`) and matches the host against the tracker lists it holds. Contacts are bounded at 20000 program x domain keys. So secrets never reach the daemon (redaction happens in the relay, before the boundary), and the daemon keeps its full network sandbox. `strawberry opensnitch enable-events` points OpenSnitch's logger at the relay (`opensnitch_events`, default `127.0.0.1:979`); the installer runs it and starts `strawberry-trackerd`. `privacy_trackers=false` disables both ends. Relaxing the daemon sandbox or systemd socket activation were considered and rejected (they lose the network isolation or the root-peer check). 3. **Output.** A root-only `tracker_contact` telemetry record per program and domain (rate-limited: first contact, then counts per hour), a `privacy` block in status, and `strawberry privacy trackers` (per program: list domains contacted, counts, first and last seen). macOS: the same feeds, contacts and output. There is no network sandbox to work around, so the daemon (root) reads Little Snitch's `log-traffic --stream` directly — no relay or ingest socket. `littlesnitch_cli` sets the CLI path (default `/Applications/Little Snitch.app/Contents/Components/littlesnitch`); it needs Little Snitch's "Allow access via Terminal" (`allowCommandLineAccess`) turned on. Little Snitch's CSV has no argv/environment, so the redaction guarantee holds structurally there too; the parser keeps only program, uid, destination host/ip/port and protocol for outbound rows.