# Real-sensor validation range A self-contained local lab that produces the real **inputs** the Strawberry promotion gate consumes - raw history, delayed labels and gate models. A few Arch VMs run the real daemon (eBPF + fanotify exec guard) with realistic background activity, MITRE Caldera runs emulated adversary activity against them on a private network, and the detector's retro-hunt turns those incidents into the delayed labels the Stage 4 fleet gate counts. It extends the single-VM de-risk in `../vm` (validated 2026-11-08) to a multi-sensor fleet that runs over days. Nothing on the host is published off-box: Caldera listens on `127.0.0.1:8888` only (rootless Docker, capped), and the sensor VMs reach it over the qemu slirp gateway `10.0.2.2`. The range is **not network-isolated**, though: slirp is user-mode NAT, so guest traffic is NATed through the host, and cloud-init runs `package_update: true` and pulls packages from the Arch mirrors on first boot. Read "local" as loopback-published with no inbound exposure, not air-gapped. All payloads are **inert markers** (a copy of `/bin/sleep` with a marker string appended); there is no real malware. See `../../../.claude`-tracked memory `caldera-range` for the Caldera auth details. ## Build for travel VM disks and scheduler state live under `$SB_RANGE_DIR` (default `/var/tmp/sb-range`), **not** cleared on reboot. The attack scheduler paces by its own uptime, so suspending the laptop or rebooting simply pauses the range; `range_up.sh` resumes it and the sensors' stores keep growing across the gaps. ## Use deploy/validation/range/range_up.sh # bring up / resume (idempotent); build builddir first deploy/validation/range/range_status.sh # health: caldera, agent liveness, sensors, incidents, labels deploy/validation/range/range_down.sh # pause (keep disks + state); --destroy wipes them Then, after at least the pre-registered 12 h warm-up plus enough history for 3 periods, run the real gate from the Salt side (`orch.strawberry_cycle` then `orch.strawberry_gate`) — or, for a host-only check, `strawberry fleet gate` over each sensor's `replay --policy-eval --eval-model ... --periods 3` report. See `docs/evaluation/stage4-fleet-gate.md`. Those reports are the gate's *input*, not a passing result. Replaying a sensor's whole store scores windows inside the range its gate models recorded as their training range, so every cell publishes `in_sample: true` and fails with `FAIL: out-of-sample: ...`: the gate refuses such a set instead of promoting. A passing verdict requires the evaluation to be bounded after the models' training range (`replay --policy-eval --eval-after NS|auto`: absolute ns, or `auto` = the latest training-range end among the `--eval-model` files), so the reports' `eval_first_ns` falls after `training_last_ns`. The bound also separates the label-free history the gate comparator (`rarity_calibrated`) freezes its threshold from; without a bound the comparator is uncalibrated and the cell fails by name. On this range the bound is fixed by [the rarity-baseline pre-registration](../../../docs/evaluation/stage4-rarity-baseline-preregistration.md): the span up to 2026-11-20 was seen before the comparator was defined, so gate evidence comes only from windows after its registration time. On each sensor: strawberry replay /var/lib/strawberry/evidence --policy-eval \ --eval-model seed1.sbm --eval-model seed2.sbm --eval-model seed3.sbm \ --periods 3 --eval-after 1795219200000000000 --json then `strawberry fleet gate `. A run with an earlier bound is a diagnostic, not evidence. ## What it exercises that the Docker fleet test cannot - a real kernel: eBPF process monitoring and the fanotify exec guard (containers here cannot); - a real baseline: days of varied benign activity the attacks must stand out from; - the real label path: incidents are **unknown to the rules at exec time**, then a later rule update + retro-hunt labels the earlier windows — the delayed "extra positives" the gate measures, produced the way they occur in production, not injected. ## Files | file | role | |---|---| | `range_common.sh` | shared paths, host-safety floors, ssh/scp, verified VM/scheduler lookups | | `range_up.sh` | boot/resume Caldera + sensor VMs, provision, start the scheduler (writes its pid file) | | `range_workload.sh` | benign background activity inside each sensor (systemd unit) | | `range_attack.py` | scheduler: one distinct Caldera incident per interval, then delayed labels | | `range_status.sh` / `range_down.sh` | health; pause or destroy | | `user-data.tmpl` | cloud-init for a sensor VM | Requires: a built `builddir`, the `../vm` base image + ssh key, the `caldera:slim` image, `qemu`, `cloud-localds`. The `$SB_RANGE_DIR` runtime tree is disposable; nothing here writes to the repo. Reserve about 10 GiB of available host memory for the three 2-GiB VMs, Caldera and headroom; do not run compiler/build jobs concurrently with the range (a 2026-11-17 global OOM was caused by concurrent compilers, not the range alone). `range_up.sh` checks MemAvailable and free disk once, before it starts anything: below 10 GiB (`RANGE_MIN_AVAIL_MB`) or 20 GiB free (`RANGE_MIN_DISK_GB`) it refuses. That gate is start-time only — nothing in the range pauses itself, so a long-running monitor must call `range_down.sh` (pause, disks and state kept) when host headroom falls below its own floor (8 GiB is the working one); `range_status.sh` prints the current headroom. `range_down.sh` stops every sensor the range has on disk — every `sensor-N` id found in `RANGE_DIR/vms` (pid file, disk or seed), not just the first `SB_RANGE_SENSORS` — ACPI-powering each verified VM off, then TERM/KILL for any QEMU whose command line still names this range's disks. A lowered sensor count, a stale pid file or a recycled PID therefore cannot leave a VM running. `--destroy` refuses to delete while any such QEMU (or this range's scheduler) is still alive, and deletes only the `sensor-N.qcow2` / `sensor-N-seed.iso` names it created: a foreign `*.qcow2` in `vms/` is reported and kept, never unlinked. `vm_pid()` only accepts a PID whose command line still names that sensor's QEMU and disk, so a recycled PID is never counted as a live VM or signalled. Each sensor VM gets `SB_RANGE_VM_MEM` MiB (default 2048). Lower it (e.g. 1536) on a host that cannot keep ~8 GiB free with three VMs up: the daemon needs ~300 MiB, and letting a monitor pause the range every few hours costs more evidence than a smaller footprint. The attack scheduler is tracked per range: `range_up.sh` writes `RANGE_DIR/state/scheduler.pid` and `range_down.sh` / `range_status.sh` act only on a PID whose command line runs this repo's `range_attack.py` with `SB_RANGE_DIR` equal to this `RANGE_DIR` (falling back to a `/proc` scan with the same test when the pid file is missing or stale) instead of a host-wide `pkill -f range_attack.py`, so two ranges on one host never stop each other's scheduler. `range_status.sh` groups Caldera registrations per sensor group and reports live vs stale (no beacon for more than `SB_RANGE_AGENT_STALE_S`, default 300 s) or says that liveness is unknown; the registration total is never presented as a VM count, because Caldera keeps a registration for every agent restart. Sensor units use `RuntimeDirectory=strawberry` so control sockets and delayed-label reloads also work after a guest reboot.