First piece of tracker attribution (docs/tracker-attribution.md): which
programs reach advertising and tracking domains, built with the
measurement rules of the CarolinaCon 2026 privacy talk (bridgescope):
a listed domain is a circumstantial label, never proof.
- Feed kind "trackers": hosts lines, plain domains and adblock
whole-domain rules (||host^, ||host^$third-party). Cosmetic rules,
exceptions, paths and other options are skipped; the comment cut used
to turn "site.example##.ad" into a domain.
- TrackerSet: suffix matching (a.b.t.example matches t.example, never
nott.example, an IP literal or a bare TLD); first feed reported.
- List parsing moves from rule_updater.cpp to ioc_list.cpp (no network
code) so the query-side core can use it.
- Source invariant R11: tracker lists never meet exec-guard or OpenSnitch
code. They are not in the OpenSnitch blocklist sync.
Tests: T1-T3 (test_tracker_set), trackers in the list-parsing property
and the list fuzzer (60 s clean), R11 self-test fixture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A promoted model (promoted.sbm, written only by `model promote` after the
gate) can now request real inspections. Only two, both additive:
- memory_scan: through the daemon's memory-scan queue;
- deep_rescan: the root's image re-scanned on demand; new matches are
recorded as indicators of kind model_inspection (findings titled "YARA
match found by a deeper rescan the inspection model requested") and
positive labels.
watch_subtree has no mechanism and rescan_on_next_rules is the retro-hunt's
job, so both are masked out of acting decisions (kExecutableActions), and
replay's policy evaluation uses the same action set.
Guardrails:
- InspectionExecutor (bounded queue, one low-priority worker, submit()
never blocks); WorkClass::model_inspect lets the governor defer it, and
a deferred decision is dropped.
- Each action rechecks that the promoted model is still active at the
decision's generation (demoting or replacing it revokes queued work),
that the root's node id and raw image path still match (decisions carry
root_image, not the feature template), and skips protected processes.
A deep rescan discards its result if the process, image or rules changed
during the scan.
- An acting decision is durably written before it is dispatched; every
attempt becomes an inspection_outcome record (queued, scanned, skipped,
deferred, revoked, queue_full, failed).
- Source invariant R10: no file may couple learning types to the
exec-guard, OpenSnitch or policy APIs (daemon_app.cpp and main.cpp, the
wiring points, are reviewed by hand). Models never block, contain, kill
or create findings directly.
- Config model_act and model_lambda; status model block reports acting
stats; timings.model_inspection.
docs/evaluation/stage4-execution-gate.md amends the gate's method (not its
thresholds): executable action set, greedy promoted decisions, budgets as
estimated inspection seconds by scan profile.
Also: TerminalSafeBuf's destructor no longer lets an exception escape;
the health message clamps huge durations; replay timestamp overflow; the
Docker test build runs with -j2.
Tests: test_inspection_executor (every skip and execute path, revocation,
queue limits); shadow and replay acting cases; R10 fixture; fault injection
and invariant updates. Validation reported by the session that wrote it:
48/48 local, 46/46 Docker plus privileged live checks, 20 fuzz targets
(9.5M runs), three paired KPI runs without regressions (no acting model
was loaded, so active-inspection cost is not measured yet).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replay (src/learn/replay.cpp, strawberry --replay [dir] [--top N] [--json]):
reads the telemetry stream read-only, orders events by time (a 30 s
reorder buffer absorbs the writer's batching), joins behavior events to
the latest exec of their pid at that time (keeps PID reuse apart), builds
60 s windows (a root exec, its descendants and their behavior, at most 64
events), scores each exec, connection and persistence write with the
rarity model before observing it, and marks windows whose processes had
detections. Prints the most unusual windows with the tuples that made
them unusual. Deterministic. tests/test_replay.cpp: chain windows, PID
reuse, order insensitivity within the horizon, determinism, ranking,
detection marking, a real store round trip. fuzz_replay feeds arbitrary
record streams.
UTF-8: file names are bytes, and the fuzzer showed nlohmann's dump()
throwing on a path that is not UTF-8. The same applied to the daemon's
control replies (kill/suspend/quarantine name the exe path) and to the
OpenSnitch containment rule, so a binary with such a name could not be
contained, and json_escape wrote the raw bytes into status JSON. Now:
- every .dump() in src/ uses error_handler_t::replace (U+FFFD), enforced
by source invariant R9;
- json_escape writes invalid sequences as � (valid_utf8 and
utf8_sequence_length in json_util.hpp);
- containment refuses such a path with a clear error (a rule could never
match the real bytes); quarantine still blocks execution by hash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
File node ids: include/strawberry/node_ids.hpp is now the only place
they are built (file_<sha256> or file_path_<sha256 of path>). The three
modules disagreed: correlation used a 16-digit path hash and behavior
detections the raw path, so path-keyed evidence never met the rest. An
exec detection with a known hash also writes a same_path edge from the
path id to the content id. Source invariant R8 rejects hand-built file
ids in src/ and include/.
Processes carry the real uid and kernel comm: from the eBPF exec event
(which now includes the uid) or /proc. Stored on process nodes and in
process_exec telemetry (fields 14, 15).
Command lines are redacted before any storage (capture_redact_cmdline,
default on): sensitive flags and KEY=value pairs, Authorization/Bearer
credentials, URL passwords, tokens used as URL user names, well-known
token shapes (GitHub, GitLab, Slack, AWS key ids, sk-, JWTs) and mysql
-p<password>. The rules repeat to a fixed point, so redaction is
idempotent by construction. tests/test_redact.cpp covers the rules plus
idempotence, size and planted-secret properties; fuzz_cmdline_redactor
found two idempotence bugs and a leak (--password --token X) that are
fixed here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every catch now handles the exception or records it with
STRAWBERRY_NOTE_SWALLOWED() (strawberry/swallowed.hpp): an atomic count,
exported in status as resources.swallowed_exceptions, plus a file:line
log line written with write(2), so it is safe out of memory and in
destructors. The 16 empty catches (store error fallbacks, destructors,
YARA compiler callback, thread entry logging) now use it. Status also
reports thread_errors, which was counted but never exported.
Enforced by source invariant R7 (with a self-test fixture) and by
clang-tidy bugprone-empty-catch in a new .clang-tidy (errors; inherits
parent config). AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md state the rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix for the 2026-10-25 host freeze (an uncaught iostream exception on a
/proc read aborted the daemon; its core dump deadlocked with the exec
guard): non-throwing /proc reads, crash handlers that release fanotify
permission fds, guarded thread entries, from_chars parsing.
Adds the io fault-injection seam with property tests, source invariant
checks (R1-R6) with self-test fixtures, libFuzzer targets and seeds
(including I/O-fault fuzzing), the fold changed-files scan scripts and
the agent workflow docs (CLAUDE.md, prompts).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>