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Author SHA1 Message Date
trvon
0b730eace2
Stage 3.5 bench: strawberry-model-score dev tool (per-window model scoring)
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Build-only tool: loads a trained model (.sbm) and an export bundle, applies
forward(model, features) per window, prints TSV window_id/value/label/x[42] plus
a summary partitioned by the write->exec feature slot. Unblocks the novel-chain
benchmark: replay --model ranks by rarity (model_value null), so it could not
measure a model's score on holdout windows; this does. On the detector-covered
train bundle the data-flow model scores write->exec windows 0.634 vs 0.0003 for
the rest -- it clearly learned the x[42] feature.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 16:59:30 -07:00
trvon
0282066340
Stage 3.5b2: replace exec-lineage with write->exec data-flow feature
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3.5b's ordered exec-lineage proved inert in clean A/Bs; replace it with a general
write->exec data-flow feature: WindowSummary.self_written_execs (exec of a file
written earlier in the same window) at x[42], tracked via OpenWindow.written_paths.

Honest status: this is the conceptually-correct provenance feature (it separates
download->exec-the-same-file from download->exec-unrelated), but it ALSO shows no
AUC gain on detector-labeled data -- for the same structural reason as 3.5b: the
teacher labels (DownloadThenExecute etc.) correlate with existing count/location
features or re-derive the detector. Validating provenance LEARNING requires the
novel-chain generalization benchmark (train on detector-covered, hold out
detector-evading attacks); committed as that benchmark's feature foundation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 16:37:06 -07:00
trvon
8544e921a2
Stage 3.5b: ordered lineage-path bigram features
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Feed ordered parent->child exe-template bigrams into the window feature vector
(WindowSummary.lineage_edges, note_lineage_edge, a salted hash loop in featurize,
wired at replay on_exec). The model already got per-kind lineage surprisal
(x[25..29]); this adds path ORDER, which the unordered token bag discarded.

Clean A/B on a fixed corpus (same 697 windows, same flags, only the binary
differs): model AUC 0.734 -> 0.737 (rarity 0.520 unchanged). Null on this
shallow-lineage data (marker execs are 1-process, synthetic data flat) but the
feature is correct and order-sensitive (test: A>B != B>A). Kept as the path
representation that Stage 3.5c's retro-hunt attribution head needs; its payoff is
expected on real multi-stage attack telemetry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 14:22:14 -07:00
trvon
2cc137b8e7
Stage 3.5a: fleet-train --max-node-share/--test-fraction/--split
Expose the merge cap and train/test split on `strawberry fleet train` so a
single-node real-attack bundle can pre-seed a model. Default stays temporal +
cap 0.25 (behavior-preserving); `--split random` + `--max-node-share 1` lets the
Caldera-attack export (15 positive windows) train. Verified: real-only train AUC
1.0 vs rarity 0.563; default still refuses identically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 12:18:32 -07:00
trvon
cd93ec4da3
Stage 6: strawberry-fleet-inspect dev tool (bundle record + fleet_bits stats) 2026-11-08 09:29:24 -07:00
trvon
0bc61ac714
Stage 6: strawberry-fleet-seed dev tool (deterministic synthetic telemetry store for fleet validation; gap #4a) 2026-11-08 09:27:09 -07:00
trvon
39912f6e64
Stage 6: wire config node_id to export (stable node identity; gap #2) 2026-11-08 09:05:25 -07:00
trvon
b95bdb04de
Stage 6: strawberry fleet overlay CLI — produce the fleet overlay from a bundle directory (gap #1) 2026-11-08 08:59:52 -07:00
trvon
446e5c3afe
Stage 6: export populates fleet_bits from a local overlay (export_store fleet_surprisal callback; run_export loads fleet-overlay.sbo) 2026-11-08 08:09:47 -07:00
trvon
9313134aee
Stage 6: populate WindowSummary.fleet_bits from a fleet overlay during scoring (ReplayOptions.fleet_surprisal callback) 2026-11-08 08:01:40 -07:00
trvon
97374a16d2
Stage 6: fleet-overlay feature — per-kind fleet_bits[5] in featurize (reserved slots x[37..41], back-compatible) 2026-11-08 07:55:40 -07:00
trvon
7ad7596bda
Stage 6: load fleet overlay + sketch_surprisal_bits (query fleet-wide rarity for a tuple) 2026-11-08 05:38:00 -07:00
trvon
c939c3536b
Stage 6: fleet rarity overlay — sum per-node count-min sketches and serialize as an overlay bundle 2026-11-07 21:28:35 -07:00
trvon
31e4833169
Stage 6: strawberry fleet train — merge a bundle directory and train the shadow model; fleet_merge populates rarity_bits 2026-11-07 21:22:14 -07:00
trvon
ae4555ec38
Stage 6: central fleet merge core — export bundles to capped TrainingExamples (max_node_share) 2026-11-07 21:12:42 -07:00
trvon
6a028810da
Stage 6: export rarity sketches (export_rarity_delta) from the saved RarityModel state; CLI attaches them when present 2026-11-07 20:47:53 -07:00
trvon
caa7740265
Stage 6: strawberry export CLI verb + node_uid manifest + store-dir e2e (closes 1e deferred validation) 2026-11-07 20:34:33 -07:00
trvon
45f13f7f16
Stage 6: extract windows/features/labels from the store via the replay pipeline into an export bundle 2026-11-07 20:20:41 -07:00
trvon
b5bb1689f9
Stage 6: export rarity-delta record (per-TupleKind count-min, bounded decode) + harden R13 for braced initializers 2026-11-07 19:39:22 -07:00
trvon
fdd699f037
Stage 6: export payload records (window/feature/label, hybrid token hashes) + R13 redaction invariant 2026-11-07 19:32:47 -07:00
trvon
23e70fe823
Stage 6: export bundle format (fleet_export) — sealed segment reusing the store codec; RecordType export_* + R12 2026-11-07 19:12:40 -07:00
trvon
b7336de261
Stage 6: node identity (fleet.hpp) — pure node_uid + wrapper 2026-11-07 18:59:51 -07:00
trvon
74aa9664ad
Pipeline: keep oversized cache refusals unscanned
Do not turn an empty cached digest into an unbounded descriptor hash. Distinguish size refusals from YARA results so the exec guard applies its own bounded scan/degrade policy. Cover cached read budgets across size boundaries, known hashes, inventory/live events and real guard-cache reuse. Fold/live/KPI and post-rollout CPU acceptance remain pending; OpenSnitch checksum work is separate.
2026-11-03 06:57:35 -07:00
trvon
a5f2dbedfc
KPI: bound collection and reject incomplete measurements
Use suspend-aware BOOTTIME waits and owned-container cleanup without changing the workload. Reject missing coverage and preserve producer/report failures. Include runtime/helper regressions, constrained build-job support and live exec-guard crash safety. Document the failed live/idle gates without relaxing thresholds or claiming production acceptance.
2026-11-03 06:57:00 -07:00
trvon
be237d6040
Findings: reconcile evidence and harden policy rebuilds
Preserve independent support, typed rule namespaces and stable process lifetimes. Share authoritative managed-set reconciliation across daemon and offline correlation, load offline policy without seeding/migration, and release resources after shutdown-flush exceptions. Keep retirement history, transaction ownership and fault/allocation regressions; no whole-set crash-atomicity or live acceptance claim.
2026-11-03 06:55:47 -07:00
trvon
29e490dcab
Replay: add strict read-only training summaries
Reuse the existing resolver/sampler for opt-in aggregate training summaries. Reject incomplete or undecodable snapshots without usable partial reports, retain best-effort readers elsewhere, and document cooperative extent checks rather than atomic snapshot guarantees. Include command-table/help, JSON, fixture and corruption regressions; no model training or promotion.
2026-11-03 06:54:17 -07:00
trvon
52b02f1dc7
Learn: preserve label provenance and bound replay sampling
Resolve allowlist and quarantine retractions without erasing independent support. Refresh capped entity reservoirs and bound allocated slot bookkeeping; retain deterministic seeded mutation regressions.
2026-11-03 06:53:28 -07:00
trvon
c565cb5aee
Learn: handle extreme restored rarity clocks
Represent full-range ordered clock differences without signed overflow and allow complete decay. Add seeded restore-clock regressions and a dedicated fuzz seed.
2026-11-03 06:52:20 -07:00
trvon
2488423fbd
Allowlist: retire a binary's stored findings when it is allowlisted
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Allowlisting a binary suppressed only *new* detections: the findings
already stored for it stayed in the evidence store, and every reload
re-materialised them. That is why the ~9k iproute2 `ss` false positives
kept "coming back" after the hash was allowlisted a day earlier -- nothing
retracted them, and the only cleanup was `doctor fix
retire-allowlisted-findings`, which operators do not know to run.

allowlist-add now retires the now-allowlisted findings at the moment of
the action (alongside the existing containment release) and reports the
count as `retired_findings` in its reply. retire_allowlisted_findings is
hash-based and self-filtering, so a path/rule entry that matches no
fully-allowlisted finding retires nothing.

Regression test (test_daemon_runtime): a detected binary's finding is
materialised (forced correlation), allowlist-add reports
retired_findings >= 1, and after correlation re-runs the finding does not
come back (A already makes correlation skip allowlisted entities).

Also refresh the doctor findings.allowlisted message, which claimed
allowlisting does not delete stored findings -- it now does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-29 13:53:21 -06:00
trvon
728b2462e7
Governor: background work no longer starves under sustained pressure
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On a host that sits at critical/emergency for a long time (its own apps holding
most of RAM, or the daemon slightly over its soft budget), the starvation guard
was disabled (`!hard`), so correlation, retro-hunt and inventory deferred
forever — observed deferred 153 min with forced=0, which also starves the
retro-hunt delayed labels that Stage 4 training needs.

- Tiered starvation guard: it now fires under critical/emergency too, but after a
  level-scaled window (1x warning, 4x critical, 12x emergency) so background work
  is rare under load, not zero. A true host-memory crunch (host_severe_,
  MemAvailable below the severe floor) still holds everything, since forcing work
  then could tip the host toward OOM. exec guard/scan paths unchanged.
- Raise the balanced own-memory soft budget 512 -> 768 MiB: the daemon's steady
  footprint grew (telemetry buffers, the ingest server, the shadow model), so 512
  left it permanently over budget -> pinned critical/emergency. 768 fits the real
  baseline, still well under the 1.5 GiB cgroup cap.

Tests updated for the 768 budget and the tiered guard (critical forces after the
4x window; severe holds it). Suite 51/51; analyzer + clang-tidy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 22:33:25 -06:00
trvon
4ade69ec7e
Learn: allowlisted binaries are negative labels, not teacher positives
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The teacher-label join made a window a positive if it was detected
(replay.cpp), but it never applied the allowlist, so a window running a cleared
false positive (e.g. /usr/bin/ss) was labelled a teacher positive — poisoning
Stage 4 training. Negative labels were written to the stream but replay dropped
them.

- replay_store now collects negative labels into ReplayOptions.negative_labels
  (it used to ignore any non-positive label).
- A window whose exec hash is negatively labelled is marked `suppressed`; the
  example/policy-eval positive is gated on `!suppressed`, so such a window is
  kept as a *negative* training example (useful signal) and never a positive,
  even if a cleared rule "detected" it.
- DetectionPipeline seeds a negative label for every allowlisted sha256 at init,
  so evidence stored before the allowlist (the historical ss storm) is covered
  without waiting for a re-exec.

Test: a detected window with a stored negative label for its hash is a positive
before the label and a kept-negative after. Suite 51/51; analyzer + clang-tidy
clean on replay.cpp and detection_pipeline.cpp.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 22:02:56 -06:00
trvon
db654cc217
Correlation honors the allowlist, so cleared false positives stop regenerating
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Correlation runs over the whole store and never consulted the allowlist, so an
allowlisted hash (e.g. the /usr/bin/ss feed false positive the operator cleared)
regenerated the same findings on every pass from already-stored indicators —
`doctor fix retire-allowlisted-findings` cleared them but they came straight back
(~9,400 findings observed again). This also meant the findings were a poisoned
teacher-label source for training.

- classify() now skips an indicator whose (hash, path, rule) is allowlisted, the
  single chokepoint shared by CorrelationEngine::build_findings (the oracle) and
  IncrementalCorrelator::update, so both agree. New AllowlistFn; build_findings /
  correlate take an optional predicate (default = no filtering, existing tests and
  the incremental==full oracle unchanged); IncrementalCorrelator::set_allowlist.
- DetectionPipeline wires the predicate to PolicyStore::match, so the live
  incremental path skips allowlisted evidence. Retiring the findings now sticks.

Test: build_findings with an allowlist predicate emits nothing for the matched
hash and is unaffected for others. Suite 51/51; analyzer + clang-tidy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 19:52:36 -06:00
trvon
c77bc79dc7
Privacy: macOS tracker source via Little Snitch log-traffic (WS2 macOS)
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Completes the tracker-attribution transport on macOS. There is no network
sandbox to work around there, so the daemon (root) reads Little Snitch's traffic
stream directly and feeds the same on_opensnitch_connection consumer — no relay
or ingest socket (those are the Linux sandbox answer).

- LittleSnitchParser (cross-platform, unit-tested): parses `littlesnitch
  log-traffic` CSV via a header-name->index map (tolerates column reordering),
  yielding the shared redacted OpenSnitchConnection for outbound rows only
  (program, uid, host/ip/port, protocol 6->tcp/17->udp). Little Snitch's CSV has
  no argv/env, so redaction is structural. split_csv_line handles quoted fields.
- LittleSnitchSource (macOS only): posix_spawns `littlesnitch log-traffic
  --stream`, reads the pipe on a guarded thread, parses and calls back; stop()
  SIGTERMs the CLI (EOF -> loop ends) then reaps it.
- Daemon: start_tracker_attribution gains an __APPLE__ branch that starts the
  source; shutdown/status handle it. New config littlesnitch_cli (default CLI
  path). status privacy.listener source "little-snitch".
- docs: macOS section rewritten (needs Little Snitch "Allow access via Terminal").

Test E10 covers the parser (header, outbound/inbound, deny, quoted exe, no-dest).
Linux suite 51/51; analyzer + clang-tidy clean (Linux view). The __APPLE__ code
compiles/validates on the Mac next (ssh); live spawn needs root + LS Terminal access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 18:54:27 -06:00
trvon
b09c416b32
Privacy: daemon-side AF_UNIX ingest socket for the tracker relay (WS2a)
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First half of the sandbox-safe tracker transport (architecture deep dive). The
daemon's old loopback TCP listener could not bind under its own sandbox
(PrivateNetwork=true + RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX). Replace it with an
AF_UNIX ingest socket the daemon *can* bind under the sandbox; a host-namespace
relay (next change) will bind the OpenSnitch port, strip argv/env, and forward
redacted tuples here.

- opensnitch_events.hpp/cpp: encode_connection / decode_connection serialize only
  the redacted fields (never argv/env, which the parser already drops) as one
  JSON object — the relay->daemon wire form. New TrackerIngestServer: an AF_UNIX
  stream listener (Linux-only, like the TCP listener) that accepts only a root
  peer (SO_PEERCRED), frames with take_json_objects, decodes and calls back;
  bounded clients/object/buffer as before.
- daemon: start_tracker_attribution now opens the ingest socket
  (opensnitch_ingest_socket, default /run/strawberry/trackers.sock) instead of
  the in-sandbox TCP listener, so it works with the sandbox unchanged and is
  simply idle until a relay connects. status privacy.listener reports the ingest
  socket + relay_events; shutdown stops it. New config key opensnitch_ingest_socket.
- Tests: E8 encode/decode round-trip + redaction (no args/env on the wire);
  E9 TrackerIngestServer end to end (connect, two tuples, callback, stats);
  daemon-runtime configs set privacy_trackers=false (not under test).

Suite 51/51; clang static analyzer and clang-tidy clean on the changed TUs. The
relay run-mode + systemd unit + install wiring + docs follow in WS2b/WS2c.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 17:50:16 -06:00
trvon
4664ae4458
Detection: unify the two repeat-aggregation sinks + IOC severity resolution
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The scan path (handle_process) and the exec-guard recording path
(record_exec_decision) had grown two near-identical repeat-aggregation maps
(repeats_ / exec_repeats_) plus three copies of the IOC-feed severity idiom.
Refactor to one implementation; no behavior change (the existing aggregation and
IOC-severity tests are the oracle and pass unchanged).

- New include/strawberry/repeat_aggregator.hpp: RepeatAggregator owns the
  per-key window map, the 20-full-then-summary cadence and the aggregated count;
  observe(key, now, seen_ns, pid) returns {full, at_threshold, aggregated,
  emit_summary, notify, state}. Each caller keeps its own key, summary-id prefix,
  summary shape and notify behaviour. Both pipeline sinks now hold one instance
  (scan notifies at most hourly; exec passes notify_ns=0). status
  repeats_aggregated sums both totals (atomic, lock-free read).
- ioc_hit_severity(feed): one source for the three IOC match sites (scan_image,
  assess_exec, handle_process) that was the policy_->ioc_feed_severity ternary.
- Leaves the latency-critical assess_exec/decide path untouched; both sinks still
  run under mutex_, off the FAN response.

Unit test tests/test_repeat_aggregator.cpp (window reset, threshold, summary and
notify cadence, per-key independence). Suite 51/51; clang static analyzer and
clang-tidy clean on detection_pipeline.cpp; fold's 7 int-overflow are the accepted
monotonic-timestamp FP class (unchanged by the move); perf-kpi PASS, no regression
(exec_decision p50 unchanged, exec_assess/db_commit within noise or faster).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 17:39:48 -06:00
trvon
36982c4b56
Doctor: detect and retire findings for hashes you have since allowlisted
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Allowlisting a hash suppresses new detections but does not delete findings
already stored for it (e.g. the /usr/bin/ss false-positive storm). That cleanup
now lives in doctor instead of a one-off compaction.

- DetectionPipeline::retire_allowlisted_findings(dry_run): a finding is stale
  when it references at least one hash and every hash it references (from
  metadata "hashes" and file_<sha256> nodes) is allowlisted, so a finding that
  also implicates a non-allowlisted binary is never dropped. Mirrors
  retire_superseded_findings (retire_finding + transaction).
- node_ids.hpp gains content_hash_of_file_node_id() (the inverse of
  file_node_id for the content case) so the pipeline parses file ids through the
  canonical helper, not a "file_" literal (source invariant R8).
- Doctor check findings.allowlisted (warn) with maintenance action
  retire-allowlisted-findings; DoctorInputs.allowlisted_findings gathered by the
  daemon; run_maintenance handles the action; CLI `doctor fix` help + completion
  and API_CONTRACT updated.

Tests: test_retire_allowlisted_findings (two execs of a flagged binary -> a
finding; allowlist the hash -> dry-run lists it, apply retires it, idempotent);
doctor check ok/warn cases; CLI completion string. Suite 50/50; clang static
analyzer, clang-tidy and source invariants clean on the changed TUs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 11:37:52 -06:00
trvon
e93f8e37da
Detection: aggregate repeated exec-guard decisions; read /proc outside the lock
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The exec-guard would-block recording path stored one indicator (and, via
correlation's per-process grouping, one finding) per exec, with no aggregation,
unlike the scan path. A critical feed or rule matching a frequently-run binary
would flood evidence the way /usr/bin/ss did.

- record_exec_decision now collapses repeated identical decisions (keyed by
  verdict|hash|rule) with the same 10-min window / 20-full-then-summary scheme
  as handle_process (new exec_repeats_ map; counts into repeats_aggregated_).
  Beyond the window it refreshes one "exec-repeat" summary indicator and returns
  before the per-exec graph write.
- The actor's /proc identity reads are now done before taking mutex_, not under
  it. The clang static analyzer (new strict gate) flagged ::read in a critical
  section (unix.BlockInCriticalSection) here; this also honors the AGENTS rule
  that scans/reads stay off DetectionPipeline::mutex_. Analyzer now clean.

Test: test_repeated_would_block_is_summarized drives 30 identical would-block
decisions and asserts exactly 20 full exec-audit indicators + 1 exec-repeat
summary and repeats_aggregated == 10. Suite 50/50; analyzer and clang-tidy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 10:31:04 -06:00
trvon
6453d14589
Detection: IOC hash severity comes from per-feed trust, not a hardcoded critical
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A benign system binary (/usr/bin/ss) whose SHA-256 was on a noisy community hash
feed produced thousands of critical "would have been blocked" findings: IOC hash
matches were hardcoded severity "critical" at every site, and in exec_guard an
ioc_match forces a prevention hit regardless of the severity threshold.

- FeedSpec gains `max_severity` (append-only; serialize/parse/validate, control
  socket `feed-add` accepts it). Empty = default for the kind: hash feeds are
  advisory "high", not "critical". PolicyStore::ioc_feed_severity() resolves it.
- All three IOC severity sites now use the feed's severity
  (detection_pipeline.cpp scan_image, assess_exec, handle_process), replacing the
  hardcoded "critical".
- Trust gating: ExecAssessment::ioc_match is set only when the matched feed
  resolves to "critical" (a curated feed that should force prevention). A
  community feed stays advisory — its "high" is subject to prevention_min_severity
  (default "critical"), so it no longer would-blocks system tools per exec.

Tests: test_ioc_hash_detection uses an explicit critical feed (trusted path) and
asserts assess_exec forces the hit; new test_ioc_community_feed_is_advisory
asserts a default feed is "high", ioc_match is not forced, and decide_exec allows
it in audit and enforce; test_policy covers max_severity validation, the advisory
default, and a critical round-trip. Suite 50/50; clang static analyzer and
clang-tidy clean on the changed TUs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 10:18:02 -06:00
trvon
ebbc96f8b1
OpenSnitch events listener: Linux-only (accept4, pipe2); parsing stays portable
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 06:16:20 -06:00
trvon
8f6bd1d4e0
Privacy: attribute tracker contacts to programs via OpenSnitch events
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Second piece of tracker attribution (docs/tracker-attribution.md): which
programs reach domains on a trackers list. Advisory only: never a block,
never a finding (source invariant R11).

- OpenSnitch event listener: OpenSnitch's JSON "remote" logger is the
  hostname source (Strawberry's eBPF connects have none). It streams over
  TCP and cannot leave fields out, so events carry command lines and
  environments. The listener binds 127.0.0.1 at a port below 1024 (only
  root can), accepts only root-owned peers (/proc/net/tcp), bounds
  clients/object size/buffering, and reads only pid, uid, path,
  destination and action; arguments and environment are never copied.
- TrackerContacts: per program x domain, bounded at 20000 keys. A root-only
  tracker_contact telemetry record (type 25) on the first contact, then at
  most hourly with the count since.
- Status `privacy` block; control verb privacy-trackers; CLI
  `strawberry privacy trackers [--json]`.
- `strawberry opensnitch enable-events` adds the logger to OpenSnitch's
  config (with a .bak); the installer runs it when OpenSnitch is present,
  unless privacy_trackers=false. Config: privacy_trackers (default true),
  opensnitch_events (default 127.0.0.1:979).
- EasyPrivacy is a default trackers feed (GPL-3.0+ or CC-BY-SA-3.0,
  downloaded at run time).

Tests: E1-E7 (test_opensnitch_events: event fields, stream splitting,
peer uid, address rules, listener end to end, contacts and record, config
editor), the control verb, CLI translation and help, daemon status. New
fuzz_opensnitch_events (90 s clean).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 06:15:28 -06:00
trvon
2e94ae1485
Privacy: tracker list feeds (advisory only, never block)
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First piece of tracker attribution (docs/tracker-attribution.md): which
programs reach advertising and tracking domains, built with the
measurement rules of the CarolinaCon 2026 privacy talk (bridgescope):
a listed domain is a circumstantial label, never proof.

- Feed kind "trackers": hosts lines, plain domains and adblock
  whole-domain rules (||host^, ||host^$third-party). Cosmetic rules,
  exceptions, paths and other options are skipped; the comment cut used
  to turn "site.example##.ad" into a domain.
- TrackerSet: suffix matching (a.b.t.example matches t.example, never
  nott.example, an IP literal or a bare TLD); first feed reported.
- List parsing moves from rule_updater.cpp to ioc_list.cpp (no network
  code) so the query-side core can use it.
- Source invariant R11: tracker lists never meet exec-guard or OpenSnitch
  code. They are not in the OpenSnitch blocklist sync.

Tests: T1-T3 (test_tracker_set), trackers in the list-parsing property
and the list fuzzer (60 s clean), R11 self-test fixture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 05:25:53 -06:00
trvon
4bb51030b6
Stage 4: ship a training trace set; install traces
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`model train` on a host without detections stops with "0 positive
windows" and pointed at --inject-train FILE, but only the evaluation set
(standard.trace) existed. Add config/traces/training.trace: 7 attack
shapes (document macro dropper, web reverse shell, cron miner, /dev/shm
perl stager, ssh key backdoor, npm postinstall, ld.so.preload) that differ
from the evaluation set, so the gate never judges a model on what it
trained on. P4 in test_trace enforces that (no shared trace name or exec
sequence); it caught an evince -> python3 overlap in the first draft.

Both installers put the traces in /usr/local/share/strawberry/traces/
(install_traces in install_common.sh); the hint and README name it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 04:50:04 -06:00
trvon
f76db466eb
Stage 4: keep the live rarity model across daemon restarts
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The shadow scorer's rarity model started empty at every daemon start, so
each restart cost an hour of warm-up with no decisions. The daemon now
saves it to model_dir/rarity.state (checksummed, atomic write, hourly and
at stop) and restores it at start. A restored state younger than the
7-day half-life skips the warm-up; decay catches up on the first event.

A file made with other rarity settings, a bad checksum, or a negative or
non-finite count is refused with a reason (status model.rarity_state,
doctor model.rarity_state) and the model starts empty. The file must be
owned by the daemon user and not group/world writable, like model files.

Also fixes status model.warmup_windows, which was never filled in.

Tests: R1/R2 in test_learn (round trip, decay clock, refusals), S8 in
test_shadow (warm-up skipped only when recent), daemon restart restores
the saved state, doctor warning; new fuzz_rarity_state target.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 23:25:01 -06:00
trvon
bbfda149a5
Stage 4: execute a promoted model's inspections, under guardrails
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A promoted model (promoted.sbm, written only by `model promote` after the
gate) can now request real inspections. Only two, both additive:

- memory_scan: through the daemon's memory-scan queue;
- deep_rescan: the root's image re-scanned on demand; new matches are
  recorded as indicators of kind model_inspection (findings titled "YARA
  match found by a deeper rescan the inspection model requested") and
  positive labels.

watch_subtree has no mechanism and rescan_on_next_rules is the retro-hunt's
job, so both are masked out of acting decisions (kExecutableActions), and
replay's policy evaluation uses the same action set.

Guardrails:
- InspectionExecutor (bounded queue, one low-priority worker, submit()
  never blocks); WorkClass::model_inspect lets the governor defer it, and
  a deferred decision is dropped.
- Each action rechecks that the promoted model is still active at the
  decision's generation (demoting or replacing it revokes queued work),
  that the root's node id and raw image path still match (decisions carry
  root_image, not the feature template), and skips protected processes.
  A deep rescan discards its result if the process, image or rules changed
  during the scan.
- An acting decision is durably written before it is dispatched; every
  attempt becomes an inspection_outcome record (queued, scanned, skipped,
  deferred, revoked, queue_full, failed).
- Source invariant R10: no file may couple learning types to the
  exec-guard, OpenSnitch or policy APIs (daemon_app.cpp and main.cpp, the
  wiring points, are reviewed by hand). Models never block, contain, kill
  or create findings directly.
- Config model_act and model_lambda; status model block reports acting
  stats; timings.model_inspection.

docs/evaluation/stage4-execution-gate.md amends the gate's method (not its
thresholds): executable action set, greedy promoted decisions, budgets as
estimated inspection seconds by scan profile.

Also: TerminalSafeBuf's destructor no longer lets an exception escape;
the health message clamps huge durations; replay timestamp overflow; the
Docker test build runs with -j2.

Tests: test_inspection_executor (every skip and execute path, revocation,
queue limits); shadow and replay acting cases; R10 fixture; fault injection
and invariant updates. Validation reported by the session that wrote it:
48/48 local, 46/46 Docker plus privileged live checks, 20 fuzz targets
(9.5M runs), three paired KPI runs without regressions (no acting model
was loaded, so active-inspection cost is not measured yet).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 21:03:57 -06:00
trvon
b6d667b797
Stage 4: evaluate inspection policies in replay; gated promotion
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- replay --policy-eval: over ranked windows, simulates the model and
  rarity-greedy (the same chooser, rarity score / 48 as the value), each
  with its own hourly budget, and tallies the shadow decisions the daemon
  logged. Hits are inspected "extra" positives: late labels or injected
  evaluation traces on windows rules did not flag at exec time. Labels are
  known after the fact, so every action's payoff is computable without
  propensity weighting. Reports CPU-seconds, inspections, hits, recall,
  hits per CPU-second and budget refusals.
- docs/evaluation/stage4-promotion-gate.md (pre-registered): at least 10
  extra positives, model efficiency >= 1.5x rarity-greedy, model recall
  not lower. promotion_gate() checks it.
- strawberry model promote [--inject FILE] [--warmup H] [--yes]: replays
  with the shadow model, applies the gate and only then writes
  promoted.sbm; asks for confirmation.
- learn/inspection.hpp: options, the greedy chooser and the
  inspection_action record, shared by shadow mode and the evaluation.
- Fix: the hourly budget reset whenever a window closed with an earlier
  timestamp than the hour's start (windows close roughly, not strictly,
  in time order), letting spend exceed the budget; in both shadow mode
  and the evaluation.

Tests: test_replay R11 (gate criteria; extra positives exclude rule-flagged
windows; spend within the budget; logged shadow decisions joined to their
windows); CLI translations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 12:41:20 -06:00
trvon
0006a86ff4
Stage 4: shadow mode for the inspection model
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The daemon now scores live windows with the shadow model and logs the
inspection it would request. Nothing is executed.

- learn/shadow: a live replay engine (same windows and rarity as
  `strawberry replay`) fed every telemetry record on the writer thread.
  When a window closes, the model's value v gives each action a benefit
  v x reach - lambda x CPU cost; the best positive one is chosen if the
  hour's budget (10/30/120 CPU-s by scan profile) allows, else none.
  With probability 0.02 a uniformly random other action is taken instead,
  and every decision records its propensity for off-policy evaluation.
  Decisions are inspection_action telemetry records.
- Replay gains a live mode (no ranking bookkeeping, so memory stays
  bounded) and a window-closed callback.
- Daemon: model_shadow (default on) loads <model_dir>/shadow.sbm when it
  appears or changes, checked every minute; an invalid file is reported
  and not used. Status gains a `model` block (kernel, generation,
  decisions by action, exploration, would-be spend, budget refusals).
- learn_sources in src/meson.build: tests that compile the daemon from
  sources take the learning library whole.

Limits, documented: decisions come when a window closes (a few minutes
after its first exec), and the live rarity model starts empty at each
daemon start (the first hour is learned, not decided).

Tests: test_shadow (no model, greedy choices, budget never exceeded,
determinism, exploration rate and propensities, record codec); daemon
status; fuzz_telemetry_records covers inspection_action.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 12:04:40 -06:00
trvon
6a3efbc22a
Stage 4: train the inspection model offline from replay
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- Replay builds each window's WindowSummary as it goes (exec depth and
  locations, connections, writes, ptrace, module loads, scan outcomes,
  surprisal) and can collect training examples: features, a label (a
  detection or late label touched the window), time, root program and the
  rarity score. Sampled to at most 50k: positives up to a fifth,
  negatives by reservoir with at most 1% per root program.
  --inject-train traces become positive examples and are not evaluated.
- learn/train: the value head (and hidden layers) learn P(teacher
  positive) with a class-weighted log loss and Adam; positive-unlabeled
  data, so unlabeled is "not known bad", documented. Split by time
  (newest 20% tested); reports test loss, top-k hits and ROC AUC for the
  model and for the rarity baseline. Refuses with fewer than 5 positives.
  Deterministic for a seed. The policy head waits for shadow-mode
  inspection outcomes.
- CLI: `strawberry model train [store_dir] [--inject-train FILE]
  [--epochs N] [--seed N] [--out FILE] [--json]` writes the shadow model
  (generation after the newest existing one, a note saying what it was
  trained on); `strawberry model show [file]`; `strawberry replay --model
  FILE` ranks windows (and evaluates injections) by the model's value.
  Config model_dir (default /var/lib/strawberry/model).
- doctor: the model check loads promoted.sbm and shadow.sbm; an invalid
  file is a problem (it is never used).

Tests: test_train (gradients against finite differences, skipping steps
that cross a ReLU kink; a planted pattern learned to high AUC; determinism;
refusal without labels; roc_auc); test_replay R10 (examples, labels,
per-program cap, training traces, model ranking); CLI and doctor cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 11:26:12 -06:00
trvon
db81372e19
Portability: 128-bit file_clock counts (libc++), split a hex-escape literal
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Clang rejects "\x80evil" (the escape takes the 'e'); GCC accepted it and
the test used a different string than written.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 10:08:21 -06:00
trvon
abe945097e
Monitor execs and file writes on macOS with Endpoint Security
New meson option enable_endpoint_security (auto, macOS only) links
EndpointSecurity and bsm and builds three ES backends behind the
existing interfaces. Helpers are in src/platform/es_support.hpp.

- ProcessMonitor: NOTIFY_EXEC events (pid, parent, path, dev:ino,
  argv, start time) plus NOTIFY_TRACE and NOTIFY_KEXTLOAD for the
  behavior rules. Events go to a bounded queue (4096, overflow counted
  in events_dropped) drained on the monitor thread, so callbacks stay
  on one thread. Without an ES client the monitor polls libproc
  (backend "libproc"). backend_name() reports "endpoint_security".
- ExecGuard: AUTH_EXEC with the fanotify guard's rules. It fails open
  at min(timeout, ES deadline - 500 ms) and on a full queue, and on
  macOS 27+ ES_DEADLINE_MISS_MODE_FAIL_OPEN makes the kernel allow a
  missed deadline too. Platform binaries and SIP paths are never
  denied, and our own execs are muted. ES does not cache verdicts, so
  rule changes apply on the next exec. Our own cache keys on
  dev:ino:size:mtime:generation. The image is opened by path and its
  dev:ino checked against the event; a swapped file counts as
  unscanned.
- FileWatcher: NOTIFY_CREATE/RENAME/CLOSE(modified) with inverted
  target-path muting: named entries selected literally, whole
  directories by prefix. macos_watch_specs() covers launchd
  agents/daemons, periodic jobs, cron tabs, sudo drop-ins, shell rc
  files, authorized_keys, Downloads and the temp directories.
  match_watch_spec() (direct children, as with fanotify directory
  marks) is portable and tested. Home dirs come from the directory
  service (local_home_dirs).

Every ES handler is noexcept and records swallowed exceptions. Client
errors name the missing requirement (root, entitlement, Full Disk
Access), and the daemon keeps running detection-only.

macos_es_live (root, ES entitlement) checks deny/allow/cache/
platform-binary/fail-open/audit for the guard, exec telemetry and
the file watcher, using small signed payload binaries. It has not run
yet: the development Mac has SIP enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:55:21 -06:00
trvon
713122f845
Read process facts on macOS without procfs
include/strawberry/platform_process.hpp answers what /proc answers on
Linux: running PIDs (proc_listallpids), executable path
(proc_pidpath), parent and start time (sysctl KERN_PROC_PID, readable
for every process), argv (KERN_PROCARGS2) and a boot id
(kern.bootsessionuuid). A process is identified by its start time in
microseconds since the epoch plus the boot id, so node ids survive PID
reuse as on Linux. It is header-only, so the per-test source lists stay
as they are.

Users on macOS: resolve_process_ref (default root), the pipeline's
image hashing and exec-decision actor, and YaraScanner::scan_process
(scans the image by path). A synthetic procfs root still takes the
procfs code, so the existing procfs tests run on macOS too.

The resource governor samples Mach/sysctl on macOS: own CPU from
getrusage, RSS from task_info, load from getloadavg, available memory
from host_statistics64 (free + inactive + purgeable + speculative).

The behavior engine knows macOS debuggers (debugserver, dtrace) and
kext loaders (kernelmanagerd, kmutil), and macOS temp and Downloads
paths count as drop locations. The Linux lists are unchanged.

The KERN_PROCARGS2 parser is portable: a property test (exact argv
recovery, truncation never invents data, total on junk) and the
fuzz_procargs target run on every platform. test_platform_process
checks the live helpers against this process; the daemon test reads
the stopped state through sysctl on macOS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 09:55:09 -06:00