Second half of the sandbox-safe tracker transport. A small relay in the host
network namespace bridges OpenSnitch to the sandboxed daemon, so the daemon keeps
PrivateNetwork=true + RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX and never sees argv/env.
- `strawberry opensnitch relay` (new CLI verb, Map::flag -> --opensnitch-relay):
binds the OpenSnitch loopback port via the existing OpenSnitchEventListener
(root-peer check, argv/env dropped at parse), and forwards each redacted tuple
(encode_connection) to the daemon's AF_UNIX ingest socket, reconnecting on
failure. Foreground loop until SIGTERM/SIGINT; drops (not blocks) when the
socket is down. Linux-only. The listener callback runs on one thread, so the
sink needs no lock.
- scripts/strawberry-trackerd.service: runs the relay in the host namespace with
only CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, no PrivateNetwork, and /proc/net kept readable for
the peer check (no ProcSubset=pid); otherwise the same tight sandbox as
strawberry-update.service. install.sh installs+manifests+starts it when
OpenSnitch is present and privacy_trackers is not false.
- docs/tracker-attribution.md: replace the "known limitation" with the relay
architecture (rejected alternatives noted). API_CONTRACT: privacy.listener now
describes the ingest socket + relay; also documents feed-add max_severity (B1).
Suite 51/51; clang static analyzer and clang-tidy clean on main.cpp and
cli_commands.cpp. Full relay->OpenSnitch end-to-end needs host validation
(sudo + a real OpenSnitch); the socket path is covered by E9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>