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Author SHA1 Message Date
trvon
29e490dcab
Replay: add strict read-only training summaries
Reuse the existing resolver/sampler for opt-in aggregate training summaries. Reject incomplete or undecodable snapshots without usable partial reports, retain best-effort readers elsewhere, and document cooperative extent checks rather than atomic snapshot guarantees. Include command-table/help, JSON, fixture and corruption regressions; no model training or promotion.
2026-11-03 06:54:17 -07:00
trvon
52b02f1dc7
Learn: preserve label provenance and bound replay sampling
Resolve allowlist and quarantine retractions without erasing independent support. Refresh capped entity reservoirs and bound allocated slot bookkeeping; retain deterministic seeded mutation regressions.
2026-11-03 06:53:28 -07:00
trvon
bbfda149a5
Stage 4: execute a promoted model's inspections, under guardrails
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A promoted model (promoted.sbm, written only by `model promote` after the
gate) can now request real inspections. Only two, both additive:

- memory_scan: through the daemon's memory-scan queue;
- deep_rescan: the root's image re-scanned on demand; new matches are
  recorded as indicators of kind model_inspection (findings titled "YARA
  match found by a deeper rescan the inspection model requested") and
  positive labels.

watch_subtree has no mechanism and rescan_on_next_rules is the retro-hunt's
job, so both are masked out of acting decisions (kExecutableActions), and
replay's policy evaluation uses the same action set.

Guardrails:
- InspectionExecutor (bounded queue, one low-priority worker, submit()
  never blocks); WorkClass::model_inspect lets the governor defer it, and
  a deferred decision is dropped.
- Each action rechecks that the promoted model is still active at the
  decision's generation (demoting or replacing it revokes queued work),
  that the root's node id and raw image path still match (decisions carry
  root_image, not the feature template), and skips protected processes.
  A deep rescan discards its result if the process, image or rules changed
  during the scan.
- An acting decision is durably written before it is dispatched; every
  attempt becomes an inspection_outcome record (queued, scanned, skipped,
  deferred, revoked, queue_full, failed).
- Source invariant R10: no file may couple learning types to the
  exec-guard, OpenSnitch or policy APIs (daemon_app.cpp and main.cpp, the
  wiring points, are reviewed by hand). Models never block, contain, kill
  or create findings directly.
- Config model_act and model_lambda; status model block reports acting
  stats; timings.model_inspection.

docs/evaluation/stage4-execution-gate.md amends the gate's method (not its
thresholds): executable action set, greedy promoted decisions, budgets as
estimated inspection seconds by scan profile.

Also: TerminalSafeBuf's destructor no longer lets an exception escape;
the health message clamps huge durations; replay timestamp overflow; the
Docker test build runs with -j2.

Tests: test_inspection_executor (every skip and execute path, revocation,
queue limits); shadow and replay acting cases; R10 fixture; fault injection
and invariant updates. Validation reported by the session that wrote it:
48/48 local, 46/46 Docker plus privileged live checks, 20 fuzz targets
(9.5M runs), three paired KPI runs without regressions (no acting model
was loaded, so active-inspection cost is not measured yet).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 21:03:57 -06:00
trvon
92cb4e9ba8
Add --replay, and keep non-UTF-8 host strings from breaking JSON
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Replay (src/learn/replay.cpp, strawberry --replay [dir] [--top N] [--json]):
reads the telemetry stream read-only, orders events by time (a 30 s
reorder buffer absorbs the writer's batching), joins behavior events to
the latest exec of their pid at that time (keeps PID reuse apart), builds
60 s windows (a root exec, its descendants and their behavior, at most 64
events), scores each exec, connection and persistence write with the
rarity model before observing it, and marks windows whose processes had
detections. Prints the most unusual windows with the tuples that made
them unusual. Deterministic. tests/test_replay.cpp: chain windows, PID
reuse, order insensitivity within the horizon, determinism, ranking,
detection marking, a real store round trip. fuzz_replay feeds arbitrary
record streams.

UTF-8: file names are bytes, and the fuzzer showed nlohmann's dump()
throwing on a path that is not UTF-8. The same applied to the daemon's
control replies (kill/suspend/quarantine name the exe path) and to the
OpenSnitch containment rule, so a binary with such a name could not be
contained, and json_escape wrote the raw bytes into status JSON. Now:
- every .dump() in src/ uses error_handler_t::replace (U+FFFD), enforced
  by source invariant R9;
- json_escape writes invalid sequences as � (valid_utf8 and
  utf8_sequence_length in json_util.hpp);
- containment refuses such a path with a clear error (a rule could never
  match the real bytes); quarantine still blocks execution by hash.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 21:49:04 -06:00