Completes the tracker-attribution transport on macOS. There is no network
sandbox to work around there, so the daemon (root) reads Little Snitch's traffic
stream directly and feeds the same on_opensnitch_connection consumer — no relay
or ingest socket (those are the Linux sandbox answer).
- LittleSnitchParser (cross-platform, unit-tested): parses `littlesnitch
log-traffic` CSV via a header-name->index map (tolerates column reordering),
yielding the shared redacted OpenSnitchConnection for outbound rows only
(program, uid, host/ip/port, protocol 6->tcp/17->udp). Little Snitch's CSV has
no argv/env, so redaction is structural. split_csv_line handles quoted fields.
- LittleSnitchSource (macOS only): posix_spawns `littlesnitch log-traffic
--stream`, reads the pipe on a guarded thread, parses and calls back; stop()
SIGTERMs the CLI (EOF -> loop ends) then reaps it.
- Daemon: start_tracker_attribution gains an __APPLE__ branch that starts the
source; shutdown/status handle it. New config littlesnitch_cli (default CLI
path). status privacy.listener source "little-snitch".
- docs: macOS section rewritten (needs Little Snitch "Allow access via Terminal").
Test E10 covers the parser (header, outbound/inbound, deny, quoted exe, no-dest).
Linux suite 51/51; analyzer + clang-tidy clean (Linux view). The __APPLE__ code
compiles/validates on the Mac next (ssh); live spawn needs root + LS Terminal access.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second half of the sandbox-safe tracker transport. A small relay in the host
network namespace bridges OpenSnitch to the sandboxed daemon, so the daemon keeps
PrivateNetwork=true + RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX and never sees argv/env.
- `strawberry opensnitch relay` (new CLI verb, Map::flag -> --opensnitch-relay):
binds the OpenSnitch loopback port via the existing OpenSnitchEventListener
(root-peer check, argv/env dropped at parse), and forwards each redacted tuple
(encode_connection) to the daemon's AF_UNIX ingest socket, reconnecting on
failure. Foreground loop until SIGTERM/SIGINT; drops (not blocks) when the
socket is down. Linux-only. The listener callback runs on one thread, so the
sink needs no lock.
- scripts/strawberry-trackerd.service: runs the relay in the host namespace with
only CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, no PrivateNetwork, and /proc/net kept readable for
the peer check (no ProcSubset=pid); otherwise the same tight sandbox as
strawberry-update.service. install.sh installs+manifests+starts it when
OpenSnitch is present and privacy_trackers is not false.
- docs/tracker-attribution.md: replace the "known limitation" with the relay
architecture (rejected alternatives noted). API_CONTRACT: privacy.listener now
describes the ingest socket + relay; also documents feed-add max_severity (B1).
Suite 51/51; clang static analyzer and clang-tidy clean on main.cpp and
cli_commands.cpp. Full relay->OpenSnitch end-to-end needs host validation
(sudo + a real OpenSnitch); the socket path is covered by E9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The packaged strawberry.service runs with PrivateNetwork=true and
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX, so the OpenSnitch-events loopback listener
cannot bind (EAFNOSUPPORT/EPERM) and could not reach OpenSnitch's host namespace
anyway. Rather than surface a bare errno:
- start_tracker_attribution() translates the sandbox bind failure into a plain
explanation in status privacy.error (names PrivateNetwork/RestrictAddressFamilies
and points at docs/tracker-attribution.md). Nothing blocks, no finding.
- install.sh no longer implies tracker events are working: it says OpenSnitch was
*configured* to send, and to check `strawberry status` (privacy.listener), since
the daemon can only receive if its sandbox permits a loopback listener.
- docs/tracker-attribution.md documents the limitation and that the planned fix is
a host-namespace relay over the AF_UNIX control socket (sandbox preserved);
relaxing the sandbox is an operator choice, not a default.
Transport redesign deferred to the architecture deep dive. Suite 50/50; clang
static analyzer and clang-tidy clean on daemon_app.cpp.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- scripts/analyze_changed.sh + `make analyze`: clang-check --analyze over the
changed TUs via builddir/compile_commands.json (host build may be gcc; clang
tolerates those flags), nice -n 19, 2 at a time. Strict by default (any
analyzer diagnostic fails), ANALYZE_STRICT=0 reports only; ANALYZE_FILES/--all
override selection. Results in build/audit/out/analyze.log.
- AGENTS.md "Per-change checks": new analyzer row, positioned as path-sensitive
intra-TU analysis that complements fold's bounded symbolic cross-call pass and
the syntactic invariants (run all three); YAMS index-at-checkpoint reminder.
- CLAUDE.md: analyzer added to the checks pointer + a Performance & C++ bullet
(perf-kpi + Tracy/PerfStats).
- docs/prompts/PROMPT-strawberry-audit.md: "Clang static analyzer" subsection
under Symbolic SAST.
No C++ changed; unit suite 50/50 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second piece of tracker attribution (docs/tracker-attribution.md): which
programs reach domains on a trackers list. Advisory only: never a block,
never a finding (source invariant R11).
- OpenSnitch event listener: OpenSnitch's JSON "remote" logger is the
hostname source (Strawberry's eBPF connects have none). It streams over
TCP and cannot leave fields out, so events carry command lines and
environments. The listener binds 127.0.0.1 at a port below 1024 (only
root can), accepts only root-owned peers (/proc/net/tcp), bounds
clients/object size/buffering, and reads only pid, uid, path,
destination and action; arguments and environment are never copied.
- TrackerContacts: per program x domain, bounded at 20000 keys. A root-only
tracker_contact telemetry record (type 25) on the first contact, then at
most hourly with the count since.
- Status `privacy` block; control verb privacy-trackers; CLI
`strawberry privacy trackers [--json]`.
- `strawberry opensnitch enable-events` adds the logger to OpenSnitch's
config (with a .bak); the installer runs it when OpenSnitch is present,
unless privacy_trackers=false. Config: privacy_trackers (default true),
opensnitch_events (default 127.0.0.1:979).
- EasyPrivacy is a default trackers feed (GPL-3.0+ or CC-BY-SA-3.0,
downloaded at run time).
Tests: E1-E7 (test_opensnitch_events: event fields, stream splitting,
peer uid, address rules, listener end to end, contacts and record, config
editor), the control verb, CLI translation and help, daemon status. New
fuzz_opensnitch_events (90 s clean).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First piece of tracker attribution (docs/tracker-attribution.md): which
programs reach advertising and tracking domains, built with the
measurement rules of the CarolinaCon 2026 privacy talk (bridgescope):
a listed domain is a circumstantial label, never proof.
- Feed kind "trackers": hosts lines, plain domains and adblock
whole-domain rules (||host^, ||host^$third-party). Cosmetic rules,
exceptions, paths and other options are skipped; the comment cut used
to turn "site.example##.ad" into a domain.
- TrackerSet: suffix matching (a.b.t.example matches t.example, never
nott.example, an IP literal or a bare TLD); first feed reported.
- List parsing moves from rule_updater.cpp to ioc_list.cpp (no network
code) so the query-side core can use it.
- Source invariant R11: tracker lists never meet exec-guard or OpenSnitch
code. They are not in the OpenSnitch blocklist sync.
Tests: T1-T3 (test_tracker_set), trackers in the list-parsing property
and the list fuzzer (60 s clean), R11 self-test fixture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Written before any threat trace is collected or evaluated. Train on
families first reported before 2025-07-01, evaluate on families first
reported after it (new-family bucket primary), from public write-ups and
Atomic Red Team only: Triage and MalwareBazaar terms forbid ML training.
Adds gate criterion 5 (model recall >= rarity-greedy on new families).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A promoted model (promoted.sbm, written only by `model promote` after the
gate) can now request real inspections. Only two, both additive:
- memory_scan: through the daemon's memory-scan queue;
- deep_rescan: the root's image re-scanned on demand; new matches are
recorded as indicators of kind model_inspection (findings titled "YARA
match found by a deeper rescan the inspection model requested") and
positive labels.
watch_subtree has no mechanism and rescan_on_next_rules is the retro-hunt's
job, so both are masked out of acting decisions (kExecutableActions), and
replay's policy evaluation uses the same action set.
Guardrails:
- InspectionExecutor (bounded queue, one low-priority worker, submit()
never blocks); WorkClass::model_inspect lets the governor defer it, and
a deferred decision is dropped.
- Each action rechecks that the promoted model is still active at the
decision's generation (demoting or replacing it revokes queued work),
that the root's node id and raw image path still match (decisions carry
root_image, not the feature template), and skips protected processes.
A deep rescan discards its result if the process, image or rules changed
during the scan.
- An acting decision is durably written before it is dispatched; every
attempt becomes an inspection_outcome record (queued, scanned, skipped,
deferred, revoked, queue_full, failed).
- Source invariant R10: no file may couple learning types to the
exec-guard, OpenSnitch or policy APIs (daemon_app.cpp and main.cpp, the
wiring points, are reviewed by hand). Models never block, contain, kill
or create findings directly.
- Config model_act and model_lambda; status model block reports acting
stats; timings.model_inspection.
docs/evaluation/stage4-execution-gate.md amends the gate's method (not its
thresholds): executable action set, greedy promoted decisions, budgets as
estimated inspection seconds by scan profile.
Also: TerminalSafeBuf's destructor no longer lets an exception escape;
the health message clamps huge durations; replay timestamp overflow; the
Docker test build runs with -j2.
Tests: test_inspection_executor (every skip and execute path, revocation,
queue limits); shadow and replay acting cases; R10 fixture; fault injection
and invariant updates. Validation reported by the session that wrote it:
48/48 local, 46/46 Docker plus privileged live checks, 20 fuzz targets
(9.5M runs), three paired KPI runs without regressions (no acting model
was loaded, so active-inspection cost is not measured yet).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- replay --policy-eval: over ranked windows, simulates the model and
rarity-greedy (the same chooser, rarity score / 48 as the value), each
with its own hourly budget, and tallies the shadow decisions the daemon
logged. Hits are inspected "extra" positives: late labels or injected
evaluation traces on windows rules did not flag at exec time. Labels are
known after the fact, so every action's payoff is computable without
propensity weighting. Reports CPU-seconds, inspections, hits, recall,
hits per CPU-second and budget refusals.
- docs/evaluation/stage4-promotion-gate.md (pre-registered): at least 10
extra positives, model efficiency >= 1.5x rarity-greedy, model recall
not lower. promotion_gate() checks it.
- strawberry model promote [--inject FILE] [--warmup H] [--yes]: replays
with the shadow model, applies the gate and only then writes
promoted.sbm; asks for confirmation.
- learn/inspection.hpp: options, the greedy chooser and the
inspection_action record, shared by shadow mode and the evaluation.
- Fix: the hourly budget reset whenever a window closed with an earlier
timestamp than the hour's start (windows close roughly, not strictly,
in time order), letting spend exceed the budget; in both shadow mode
and the evaluation.
Tests: test_replay R11 (gate criteria; extra positives exclude rule-flagged
windows; spend within the budget; logged shadow decisions joined to their
windows); CLI translations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Decided 2026-10-27 (docs/cli-ux.md):
- Exit codes: 0 done/healthy, 1 negative result (unhealthy, not found,
daemon refused), 2 usage, 3 could not run here (daemon unreachable,
permission denied, store not readable, feature not built). Daemon
unreachable used to exit 2, like a usage error.
- Process kill/suspend, quarantine, allowlist-add, protection-set to
enforce, store compact and doctor fix (without --dry-run) say what they
will do and ask "Proceed? [y/N]" on a terminal; Enter or EOF is no.
Without a terminal they need --yes, else exit 2 with nothing done.
This applies to the flag form too (--policy-set process-kill ...).
The desktop app talks to the control socket directly and is unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Evidence strings are attacker-controlled: every CLI command's stdout
and stderr now pass through a filter that shows control characters
(C0, DEL, C1) and invalid UTF-8 as \xNN (src/term_safe.hpp), so a
crafted process name or path cannot inject terminal escape sequences.
The daemon's journal output is unchanged.
- `strawberry` alone prints help; an unknown word (`strawberry fix`) is an
error with a "did you mean" hint. Both used to start a daemon as the
calling user with the word as its config path. Config paths (contain
'/' or end in .conf) still run the daemon, for older units.
- Shell completions generated from the command table: `strawberry
completion bash|zsh|fish`; install.sh installs them under
/usr/local/share.
- One correlation pass at daemon start (stored findings catch up with the
current rules, e.g. stable ids), and retire-superseded-findings
correlates first, so replacements exist before old copies are retired.
The user's first run reported "no duplicates" for that reason.
- docs/cli-ux.md: CLI UX rules adapted from yams (grammar, flags, human
and JSON output, status words, security rules for output, help and
completions, adding a command, known gaps). Exit code 3 and
confirmation prompts are proposed there, pending a decision. AGENTS.md
and CLAUDE.md point to it.
tests/test_cli.cpp: bare and unknown words, terminal_safe and the stream
filter, completion scripts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
strawberry [--config PATH] [--json] <command> [<subcommand>] [args] [--flags]
status, doctor, doctor fix <action>, daemon run, findings list/show/
correlate, process search/trace/trace-node/suspend/resume/kill, scan
file/processes/memory, rules reload/update/check/fetch, policy show/set,
opensnitch enable-checksums, store verify/compact, replay, demo seed,
help [command], version.
One table in src/cli_commands.cpp defines each command (words,
positionals, flags, help) and how it maps onto the existing flag form,
which main() still parses; help is generated from the same table.
Unknown options and wrong arity print the command's usage. Process
actions validate node ids before building their JSON payload.
The older flag form (strawberry --status, strawberry <config>) still
works. The systemd units now run `strawberry daemon run --config ...` and
`strawberry rules fetch --config ...`. README, AGENTS.md and the
false-positive guide use the command form.
doctor renders the daemon's checks with their fixes; doctor fix runs a
maintenance action (with --dry-run). Against an older daemon the CLI says
to reinstall rather than "unknown command". replay explains that
telemetry is root-only instead of reporting zeros, and keeps config
output out of --json.
tests/test_cli.cpp: translations, flag-form passthrough, errors, help.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- src/learn/trace.cpp: a small trace format (exec, connect, write,
ptrace, module with +offsets and process aliases) compiled to
telemetry records with pids above any pid_max and node ids that name
the trace and copy.
- --replay --inject FILE [--inject-copies N]: copies are spread evenly
over the ranked history (a first pass reads the time range), scored
but never learned from, and checked against alert budgets of 1, 3 and
10 per day: is the copy's best window above the (budget x days)-th best
real window? Ties count against. Injection leaves real windows and
their ranking unchanged.
- config/traces/standard.trace: the six plan traces (browser to curl|sh,
systemd user persistence, memfd loader, ptrace injection, download
then exec, python from a PDF viewer).
- docs/evaluation/stage3-rarity-preregistration.md: method and pass
thresholds, written before any run on host data.
Tests: test_trace (standard traces, error messages with line numbers,
records); test_replay R8 (every copy found, real ranking unchanged, a
novel chain caught at 10/day and a bare shell not). fuzz_trace_dsl.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per the triage decisions:
- DeletedExecutable when a new file exists at the executable's path (an
update or reinstall) is stored as evidence only. A binary with nothing
left at its path still raises a low finding.
- scripts/install.sh writes /var/lib/strawberry/installed-files.sha256
(hashes of the units it installs, root-owned, written first). A
PersistenceWrite whose file matches its listed hash is evidence only;
other content at those paths, or a suspicious writer, is reported as
before. The daemon ignores a manifest that is not root-owned or is
group/world-writable.
Evidence-only indicators make no finding, alert or containment on their
own; correlation counts them when the same process has another signal.
Status reports pipeline.evidence_only. Tests cover the manifest, the
behavior hook, correlation and the pipeline (replaced vs deleted).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Triage of all 26 findings on a developer workstation (none malicious)
is in docs/false-positives.md: binaries replaced while running
(auto-updates, reinstalls), Strawberry's own installer writing its
systemd units, sanitizer/self-debugging ptrace, deliberate tests, and
the test marker matching process memory.
Fixes:
- behavior detections now honor path and rule allowlist entries (they
only checked sha256, which is computed for high severity only)
- finding summaries include what happened (file written, ptrace
target) and metadata.details
- Strawberry_Test_Marker only matches files that start with the marker
(EICAR-style); it no longer fires on processes holding the text
- ptrace between a parent and child running the same binary
(LeakSanitizer StopTheWorld) is low instead of medium; ProcessRef
carries the parent pid
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nothing shipped used the library after the event store landed. A small
reader/writer for its file format (src/store/legacy_kv) replaces it for
the legacy code, and the submodule, subproject and library test are
removed.
A writer open now imports a legacy database.db file into the event
store: indicators are replayed in an order consistent with the old
hash/rule indexes, the result is verified against the old file, the
old file is kept as database.db.migrated-<ts>, and an import
interrupted between its final renames is finished on the next open.
Read-only handles read a legacy file directly and switch to the store
once it is imported. Ids re-stored under another hash are reported
(their old index entries cannot be carried over).
Tests: legacy import properties I1-I6 (locked and corrupt files are
left untouched), the differential test now shares its comparisons, and
fuzz_legacy_kv covers the file parser. A copy of a real 137 KB legacy
database imported cleanly into 7 KB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix for the 2026-10-25 host freeze (an uncaught iostream exception on a
/proc read aborted the daemon; its core dump deadlocked with the exec
guard): non-throwing /proc reads, crash handlers that release fanotify
permission fds, guarded thread entries, from_chars parsing.
Adds the io fault-injection seam with property tests, source invariant
checks (R1-R6) with self-test fixtures, libFuzzer targets and seeds
(including I/O-fault fuzzing), the fold changed-files scan scripts and
the agent workflow docs (CLAUDE.md, prompts).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>